The strategies of international security policy have significantly changed since the end of the Cold War, as have the challenges posed by international terrorism and the increase of global inequality. In women’s policy and feminist networks, interest in foreign and security policy ideas has also grown in recent years. Not least because of the commitment to and adoption of UN Resolution 1325, for the first time in the history of the United Nations a requirement was adopted, binding under international law, respecting the participation of women in decisions about war and peace. Finally: Armed conflicts are related to unjust gender relations. In this publication the Gunda Werner Institute in the Heinrich Böll Foundation presents a detailed position paper to contribute to the international debate on peace and security policy. The paper is based on a 2006 discussion paper, which has been extensively updated and revised.
PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ALL
Peace and Security for All
Feminist Positions and Perspectives on Peace and Security Policy

A position paper of the Gunda Werner Institute for Feminism and Gender Democracy

Edited by the Heinrich Böll Foundation
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The discussion paper “Peace and Security for All” was first published in 2006 as a “feminist critique of current security policy” by what was then the Feminist Institute at the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

The booklet has been much in demand, attesting to the interest as well as the need for a fundamental feminist position on peace and security policy. Three years later, the paper is still relevant. This shows how painstakingly slow progress is in this area.

Nevertheless, in recent years, some things have changed in international security, peace, and development policy. More than ever Europe has become an international player; the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated – especially for women; the US is withdrawing from Iraq; and last but not least: Barack Obama has moved into the White House.

We, the Gunda Werner Institute for Gender Democracy and Feminism, the successor to the Feminist Institute, publish this second edition as an update that takes into account changes in international relations and political strategies, even though its fundamental feminist positions remain unaffected. The journalist Ute Scheub, who was part of the Feminist Institute’s first working group, “Gender in Peace Policy”, has authored the update, while the volunteers of the “Gender in Peace Policy” provided the expert input. Many thanks to them all – and especially to Ute Scheub.

Berlin, Summer 2009

Gitti Hentschel
*Director of the Gunda Werner Institute for Feminism and Gender Democracy in the Heinrich Böll Foundation*
Feminist Positions and Perspectives on Peace and Security Policy

The following position paper was initially published in 2006, by what was then the Feminist Institute, in the context of the interdisciplinary Working Group on Gender in Peace, Security Policy and the Prevention of Civil Conflict. It was updated by Ute Scheub at the end of 2008. For their contributions and support we would like to thank the following people: Prof. Dr. Christine Eifler (University of Bremen), Prof. Dr. Cilja Harders (Ruhr University at Bochum), Jutta Kühl (advisor on feminist policies, Berlin), Prof. Dr. Ilse Lenz (Ruhr University at Bochum), Daphné Lucas (Berlin/Geneva), Dr. Regine Mehl (German Development Institute, Bonn), Ute Scheub (journalist and author, Berlin), Dr. Cornelia Ulbert (Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg University at Essen), Barbara Unger (consultant, Berlin), Johanna Bussemer (Berlin), Gitti Hentschel, Ulrike Allroggen and Magdalena Freudenschuß (formerly of the Feminist Institute).
1 War and Peace Have a Gender Dimension

By now there is a worldwide movement of women and men campaigning for gender justice, for the universal application of human rights, and for peaceful conflict resolution. These activists know that armed conflicts are also related to unjust gender relations. The series of major UN conferences in the 1990s placed gender and peace policy issues on the international agenda and strengthened civil society. The normative framework of human rights for a peaceful and gender equal world is in place – yet it needs to be implemented.

War and peace are – at times clearly, but often indirectly – interlinked with existing gender relations. “There is no society in which women have the same status as men,” declared former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2002, in presenting the UN report on Women, Peace and Security. Women are grossly underrepresented in decision-making processes on war and peace.

When the causes of this inequality are considered things get more complicated. To answer them requires a theoretical and conceptual approach, especially when dealing with concepts such as security: Are states really the main guarantors of security? What kind of security is meant – and for whom? What is the connection between gender justice and peace? Although gender analyses would be of fundamental value for finding sustainable conflict resolutions, these questions are hardly ever discussed.

Gender as a Political and Analytical Category

In German, the English term “gender” has commonly come to refer to a person’s “social gender” as opposed to their “biological gender,” or sex. The German term for “gender relations” (Geschlechterverhältnisse) is often used as a synonym for gender.

Social gender roles are socially constructed, affected by culture and history, and thus susceptible of change. Gender describes social relations between and among men and women. Gender roles are revealed in a wide variety of life experiences, particularly those affected by origins, beliefs, age, sexual orientation, disabilities, and social class.
Gender becomes visible in five key dimensions:

Circumstances: The everyday lives of men and women differ because of differences in socialization, living conditions, and domains of activity, thus leading to divergent positions in society. Example: It is predominantly women who experience sexual violence or who look after family members.

Participation: Within different spheres of society the representation of women and men varies greatly. Examples: There are far fewer women than men in key military, economic, and political positions. Men are underrepresented in service and care-giving professions.

Resources: Access to social, material, and non-material resources is contingent on gender roles. Examples: Working women often have to look after children and do household chores. Consequently they have less free time, money, and mobility. In many regions their access to education is hampered or even denied.

Norms and values: Gender roles are socially attributed and handed down from one generation to the next. In the interaction between ascribed and (self)-constructed gender roles, identities of masculinity and femininity are constructed. Examples: men are responsible for earning the family income, women for reproductive duties. Men are considered militant, women peace-loving.

Rights: In many regions of the world, women and men have unequal rights – despite the universal declaration of human rights. Even in places where equal rights have become law the reality is usually different. Examples: In most countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, compulsory military service applies to men only; in Saudi Arabia, women are denied the right to vote; in the EU, women earn an average of 15 % less than men.

Today’s Wars and Conflicts Require New Solutions

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalization, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, security policy all over the world has changed. Meanwhile, climate change, worldwide famine, the struggle over resources, and the global financial and economic crisis have become potentially new threats to peace. They affect the living conditions of women and men – and are shaped by them – in different ways. The social group they belong to and the region they live in plays a major role. The dividing lines are, among others, between North and South, rich and poor, religions, ethnic groups, classes, and levels of education.

The living conditions of a vast majority in the European Union differ enormously from those in most African countries, although in both cases there are winners and losers. Poverty and social inequality are growing on a global
scale. Misery and impoverishment are far more dramatic in the countries of the South and East than in the West and North. According to a World Bank report of August 2008, one out of every four people in the world lives on less than $1.25 per day. Over 1.4 billion people thus “live in absolute poverty” as defined by the World Bank. Nearly a billion go hungry.

The absolute number of poor and the increasing social polarization on a global scale is a normative, or rather a human rights challenge. On the other hand, global poverty is increasingly being discussed in the context of political stability, peace, and security. How much inequality can the world “tolerate”? When and under what conditions does it turn into instability or violence?

These questions are being vigorously discussed in the context of UN reform, the Millennium Development Goals, and new security strategies. Controversy is raging over ways to overcome the economic crisis and global poverty. It would certainly be possible for developed countries to tackle the economic crisis, climate change, and the food crisis all at the same time using financial incentives for reconstruction. But institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are still biased – for them the ideal solution to overcoming poverty is unlimited growth.

Since the end of the Cold War the world has not become more peaceful. The conflict barometer, published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, listed nine wars for the year 2008, including between Russia and Georgia, Turkey, Sudan (Darfur), Somalia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Overall, the institute counted 134 armed conflicts, most of them no longer wars between countries, but conflicts raging within them.

With the violent conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which claimed millions of victims, the failure of statehood has become a central theme of security, peace, and development policy. In these fragile states the state’s monopoly on power has been broken and rivaling new and sometimes cross-border power groups are forming. Some are rebelling against autocratic rulers who could not provide for the basic needs of the population. Some are international criminal organizations that deal in weapons, raw materials, drugs and/or human beings. The protagonists spearheading the conflict on both sides are generally male and they deploy child soldiers of both genders in many of these “new wars.” According to current estimates, 250,000 children and youths under the age of 18 are fighting in more than 50 armed groups, mostly in Africa. Almost one-third of them are girls.

### Markets of Violence and Perpetrators of Violence

The ethnologist Georg Elwert, who coined the term “markets of violence” in the 1990s, defines it “as a conflict, in the form of a civil war, a warlord system or marauding, which is dominated by the economic motive of material profit.” In fragile or failed states, warlords, multinational corporations, and
private military and security agencies appear on the scene as economic players, and introduce calculated and premeditated violence to enrich themselves – such as by trade in weapons, fuel, drugs, women, and children, by kidnapping, extortion, and protection money, or by illegal or semi-legal exploitation of resources – for example, in the mines of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Often these strategies of violence are masked as ethnic conflict, such as in Afghanistan’s Pashtun areas. Their true cause, though, is frequently not a conflict between “tribes,” one over “ethnicity” or between “clans,” but one taking place in a totally deregulated economy, in societies permeated with violence, and where there are few or no job opportunities in the peaceful sectors of the economy. It is not uncommon for Western countries and even aid agencies to become involved in this war economy, e.g., if they pay protection money to warlords in order to transport relief supplies to a war-torn area. Since these perpetrators or merchants of violence profit enormously from the conflicts, they have no interest whatsoever in peace agreements and torpedo them wherever they can. This makes ending such conflicts highly difficult. A good example is the war Congo’s resource rich areas that was re-kindled in the fall of 2008.


The reasons for violent conflict are numerous and vary according to region: They include the failure or collapse of the state, corruption of the ruling elites, religious and ethnic conflicts, secessionist movements, political realignments, poverty and misery, and disputes over natural resources. Political, geostrategic, and economic interests also play an important role, along with interference by the North. Thus al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban regime were in part a product of the deliberate promotion by the United States of bin Laden and his followers during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The colonial legacy of the 19th century and, in consequence, the arbitrarily drawn borders of African countries must also be considered. A number of factors collide in each conflict, triggering these violent processes. In the analysis of causes, however, one crucial factor is regularly being overlooked – the gender dynamic. It, as well as the different ways in which women and men shape them, remain to be investigated.

**Victims of Wars and Armed Conflicts**

While in earlier wars in Europe the casualties were mainly military, the victims of today’s intra-state conflicts are primarily civilians. According to Oxfam the ratio of civilians among today’s casualties of war is as high as 80 to 84 %. Peace researcher Mary Kaldor states that in WW1 the ratio
between civilian casualties and soldiers was 1 to 8 whereas now it is the exact opposite: 8 to 1.

The Iraq War is just one example: From March 2003 to the end of 2008, some 5,000 soldiers and at least 88,000 Iraqi civilians were killed. If the indirect consequences of war, such as terrorist attacks or the lack of medical care were included, then by mid-2006 the number of Iraqi civilian casualties had already reached a shocking 392,000 and 942,000 respectively (according to a study by the Johns Hopkins University published in *The Lancet*). By this method of calculation the casualty figures for Iraq have exceeded a million dead by now.

Many effects of war such as anti-personnel mines are still virulent decades after a conflict has ended. Because, in many countries, women are responsible for fieldwork and carrying water, they are frequently injured by mines. Other long-term consequences of war include the destruction of the environment and war traumas that are passed on to future generations.

In many conflicts, male civilians are killed and females are raped. The massacre in Srebrenica, Bosnia, is one example; another is the devastation of Darfur in Sudan by mounted militias. There the demographic balance has shifted dramatically to the detriment of men – three-quarters of the victims are male.


Violent conflicts often extend beyond regional borders, as witnessed by international terrorism and the reactions to it. For the West, the attacks of September 11, 2001, but also those of March 2004 in Madrid and July 2005 in London, marked the end of a perceived sense of security within one’s own country and aroused feelings of insecurity and being under threat. The repercussions have been far-reaching. Large segments of the population approved of military interventions and restrictions on human and civil rights. Ethnic, religious, and cultural differences have been radicalized and have, in many ways, become political instruments. Religious and political fundamentalism is on the rise in a number of regions; racism and policies of exclusion have become common in the North – often with grave consequences for women’s rights.

**Violent Conflicts**

Today, peace researchers, civil-society groups, political parties, and supranational organizations are questioning previous notions of security and development. They have developed new approaches to civil conflict and crisis prevention and have fostered debate on what constitutes security. Military alliances
such as NATO and national military forces have long been the focus of their criticism. Moreover, they are calling into question the traditional state-centered view of security and promote the holistic approach long advocated by feminist peace research. This approach looks at the multiple causes of conflicts and places special emphasis on the divergent interests and needs of women and men.

The UN took up these ideas in its discourse on “human security.” What this means is that it is no longer the security of a state that is at issue but the security of every single individual. According to this approach, first published by the UN Development Program (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report, people should be able to live in “freedom from fear” and in “freedom from want.” It also includes poverty, economic injustice, and disease as threats to security. Unlike the traditional concept of security, which focuses on the state’s use of force to counter potential threats, the concept of “human security” highlights strategies for dealing with civil conflict, in which international organizations, civil society, the private sector, and individuals, can act alongside government agencies. The goal is not only to protect the parties concerned, but also to empower and strengthen them.

Security is a concept that has evolved since the late Middle Ages as an important part of the relationship between state and individual. The concept of security and the policies derived from it have changed in the context of globalization and the growing significance of international and multinational organizations.

Various Security Concepts:

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<th>Security, classical</th>
<th>Security, expanded</th>
<th>Human security</th>
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<td>national security, i.e. the protection of a state’s territorial integrity</td>
<td>national security remains central, but with broader understanding of potential security threats</td>
<td>complementary to state/national security; focusing on “human aspects” of security, rights, and development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>state</td>
<td>state</td>
<td>individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of threat</td>
<td>(inter-state) military threat</td>
<td>new threat levels, including environmental, economic, domestic conflicts, terrorism</td>
<td>inter- and intra-state conflicts, migration, post-conflict situations, poverty, health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of threat</td>
<td>security dilemma</td>
<td>outbreaks of old and new conflicts caused by the dissolution of the old bipolar structure, cross-border problems</td>
<td>greater interdependence through globalization; political and economic inequalities and instabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of defense against threat</td>
<td>deployment of force by the state (especially military)</td>
<td>deployment of force by the state, which must adapt to changing threat scenarios; increase of the state’s ability to respond through stronger international cooperation</td>
<td>countermeasures at all levels by different players (states, international organizations, private sector, civil society); protection and empowerment of parties concerned</td>
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The concept of “human security” comes close to the security concept developed by feminist peace studies. For instance, it promotes an understanding of power that stresses the idea of “having power to do something,“ rather than “having power over somebody.“ Yet this approach takes little account of the feminist demand that security for women and girls must not end at the front door to their homes. The connection between sexual violence in war and domestic violence is scarcely discussed. Furthermore, it lacks a consistent linkage to human rights and women’s rights.

The human rights approach pursued by some development NGOs and UN organizations calls for national and international action to be oriented on human rights. The three duties of a state with respect to human rights are: To protect its citizens from having their rights infringed upon by third parties (to protect), to respect individual rights as the right of citizens to defend themselves (to respect), and to provide a minimum of the basic necessities of life so that citizens can positively exercise their rights (to fulfill). If a state cannot or will not do this, the international community is called upon to step in – within the scope of the “responsibility to protect” or through humanitarian actions. Where human rights violations occur, diplomatic pressure must be applied as quickly as possible. If this is not done, and if the oppression of women is used mainly to justify military intervention, the acting state exposes itself to the suspicion that it is instrumentalizing human rights.

The concept of “human security” is based on an expanded, though not comprehensive, security concept. However, it has to be distinguished between it and the “new” or “expanded” concept of security, developed by Western security strategists and military experts. To be sure, it defines international terrorism, along with “failed states” and organized crime, as a potential new threat, but poverty, disease and environmental disasters are given short shrift. Unlike the concept of “human security,” the “extended” security concept is centered on the state, which considers the military to be the main agent for action. This novel definition of the concept of security was meant to give NATO new legitimacy when, with the end of the Cold War, it had become irrelevant. This novel understanding of security is being used by NATO and is also reflected in the EU’s security strategy, as well as in the defense policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and in the 2006 white paper published by the German ministry of defense. It is also associated with an expanded range of responsibilities for the military, which has blurred the boundaries between the civil and military sectors. So, on the one hand, the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan helps build schools, while it also engages in military anti-terrorist operations.

**The Concept of “Human Security”**

The idea of “human security” was developed by the UN in the mid-1990s. In the beginning, the question of improving human development prospects...
was firmly at its center. But soon the focus shifted to a general human rights-oriented framework. In contrast to the narrow traditional concept of security and also the expanded version, both of which concentrate on the state’s activities, the concept of “human security” sees the individual as a central player. In foreign and security policy debates, it promotes the much-neglected aspects of human development and human rights and gives these issues new visibility.

The basic criticisms of this approach are that it “securitizes” issues that really should be discussed in a development or legal context, and resolved politically. In addition, critics point out that there is the risk in solving problems by military means, which according to the logic of the security context, would make other strategies subordinate. For example, Claudia von Braunmühl criticizes: “It makes a considerable difference whether security policy is based on human rights concerns, or whether human rights policy is situated within a discussion of security.” Security with respect to food, and social justice including gender justice, are human rights and should not be seen as a security requirement. Thus from a human rights perspective, poverty is not primarily a security risk, but above all a violation of basic human rights.

Especially significant from a feminist perspective is the concept of “human security” for women in zones of war and crisis. The issue here is personal safety, protection from sexual violence, protection from deportation, freedom of movement, supply of food/water, health/hygiene, access to education and information, legal assistance, and the freedom to pursue cultural and religious practices.


The UN, international law, and the implementation of human rights are not unaffected by these developments. It was notably the UN, which, during the decade of its major international conferences, created awareness of the importance of women’s rights and human rights. Yet, in its definition of tasks, its operating principles, and its composition, the UN still remains an organization created in response to the situation after WW II. A reform is urgently needed – one that will enable it to meet the global challenges of the 21st century, especially with respect to gender policy.
Beijing Platform for Action

In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing. Parallel to the 17,000 official participants, 35,000 women from around the world met at the NGO Forum. The “Platform for Action” adopted by the conference, formulated demands for the equal participation of women in all domains of society. Two chapters are devoted to the topics “Women and Armed Conflict” and “Violence Against Women.” The World Conference on Women, the splendid culmination of years of debate, was hopeful that this would usher in a new era in international women’s policies. The implementation of the Beijing Platform, however, is proceeding slowly, and many countries have hardly reacted to its action plans, as shown by the annual review meetings of the UN Commission on Status of Women.

Local civilian organizations from North and South have provided an important impetus for a gender-equal, economically sustainable, and peaceful world. UN Resolution 1325 has played a central role in peace policy; it was adopted in the year 2000, in the aftermath of the Beijing Conference, thanks to decades of lobbying by women’s policy activists. In the summer of 2008, UN Resolution 1820 was added, with the goal of penalizing all forms of sexual violence as crimes against humanity or war crimes.

UN Resolution 1325

On October 31, 2000 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security.” This resolution provides that women be adequately represented on all levels in peacebuilding processes and in the making of security policies. UN member states are urged to take into account the different living conditions of women and men in wartime and postwar situations, in civilian crisis prevention, and in state reconstruction. Women and girls must be protected from sexual violence. The contents of the resolution can thus be summed up by three “Ps”: participation, prevention, and protection.

Resolution 1325 is considered a historic breakthrough for the international women’s peace movement. Its weakness, however, is that no quotas or time limits have been established, no funding targets set, and the results of the process are not being monitored.

The German government has so far submitted two reports on the implementation of Resolution 1325, the first in 2004, the second in 2007. The German Women’s Security Council, a network of German women peace researchers and peace activists, has been critical of both reports and has published its own “shadow reports” (www.frauensicherheitsrat.de).
The implementation of Resolution 1325 and of the Beijing Platform for Action in UN member states and the entire UN system is long in coming. The resolution can only be implemented if states and state alliances realign their military and civilian activities accordingly. Unfortunately, in Germany as well as in EU, there is a lack of political will, know-how, and the necessary resources.

**Stereotyped Gender Images in War and Peace**

Throughout history and in many cultures gender roles in times of war are stereotypical: Men fight, women do not – with few exceptions. This is slowly beginning to change, not least because in many countries there is an increasing number of female soldiers. These gender roles, the product of historical and social developments, have, however, in the collective consciousness, become “biologized”: Aggression, propensity for violence, and courage are attributed to men, passivity, peacefulness, and motherliness to women. Men are seen as warlike, women as naturally peaceful.

Thus on both sides there are two models: On the one side “soldier” and “statesman,” on the other “beautiful soul” and “Spartan mother.” Warriors and politicians are counterpoised to those to whom this discourse assigns the contradictory roles of “natural comforter” or “motherly patriot.”

This is even more true in extreme nationalism and militarism. Cynthia Cockburn and Meliha Hubic state: “The nationalist discourse aims at generating a dominating, hyperactive and combative masculinity and a domesticated, passive and vulnerable femininity.” Women are made into a vulnerable symbol of national identity in need of protection. It is precisely the apparent polarity of these two roles that makes them the primary elements for constructing militarized gender personae; they belong together, they complement each other, and thus form the basis for the social legitimation of violence.

In many societies such stereotypes lead to a close linkage of masculinity with the propensity for violence. Such aggressive notions of masculinity are especially evoked in times of war and crisis; they become fundamental features of “hegemonic masculinity,” even if they contradict the ideas and the practice of many men.

**Hegemonic Masculinity**

The term “hegemonic masculinity” comes from the work of Australian men’s studies researcher R.W. Connell, who, meanwhile, has become a woman. Connell describes four basic patterns of how men deal with one another: hegemony, subordination, complicity, and marginalization. Men behave hegemonically if they exclude or subordinate women and “lower-ranking” men, and ensure their own dominance by possession of weapons and the use of violence. In many places gay men are marginalized; they
are subjected to discrimination and subordination in a predominantly heterosexual society, as do blacks in a “white” system and proletarians in a bourgeois society. Connell’s basic idea is that all men, even those who live with subordinate or complicit masculinity, profit from the so-called “patriarchal dividend.” But it is hegemonic man who profits the most; he is the only one perfectly adapted to this system, the one who reaches its summit.


However, men are not involved in violence everywhere, and not equally so. Some refuse to accept their intended role, such as conscientious objectors and deserters, or those who flee from conscription.

**Israeli Conscientious Objectors**

During the Israeli military intervention in Lebanon in 2006, many Israeli soldiers and reservists avoided service. Hundreds refused their assignment; some were imprisoned. Many received a deferment for medical or physical reasons, according to the Israeli organizations New Profile and Yesh Gvul, which work for conscientious objectors. Others deserted or went abroad. Also there are, again and again, cases in which soldiers refuse to serve in the occupied Palestinian territories. Since the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000, more than 2000 Israelis have refused military or reserve service for reasons of conscience, because they do not want to be part of an “occupation army.” In Israel, all Jewish men and women are obliged to serve in the military. The duration of military service is three years for men, 20 months for women. After the end of the regular term, men, until the age of 50, have to serve in the reserves at least once a year for about 30 days. De facto, only women can exercise the right to conscientious objection. Men are usually sentenced to multiple two- to four-week prison sentences.

Source: [http://www.newprofile.org/](http://www.newprofile.org/)

Women are not only victims of violent conflicts. They can be part of a culture of violent conflict and share responsibility for the escalation of conflicts, directly or indirectly legitimizing violence against “the enemy” – for example as members of social groups, as weapons producers, nurses, smugglers, or mothers and wives. Some women use violence themselves and others reinforce and motivate men in the use of violence. Examples for the complicity and involvement of women in structures of violence are the female wardens in Nazi concentration camps, or the wives of SS men who spurred on their men.

Women and men have different approaches to violence. First of all, this is especially true of the state’s monopoly on violence. From a global perspective,
there are still not many policewomen and female soldiers, even though their numbers are increasing almost everywhere and are an indicator of the status of women in the respective state. Second, in the case of interpersonal violence, men have greater physical strength and use weapons more often. As to sexualized violence, in 98% of all cases men are the perpetrators and women the victims.

Female Soldiers

Since 2000, the military profession in Germany has been fully open to women as well as men. Today, about 7% of Bundeswehr soldiers are female, with 30% in the medical service. This puts Germany in about the middle, compared to other nations: In Israel about 32% of soldiers are women; in the United States and Russia, about 15%. In Canada it is nearly 12%, in France, Belgium, Britain, and the Netherlands about 10, in Spain and Portugal 6, Norway 5, Denmark 3, in Italy and Turkey about 1%.

However, in no army in the world does the female sex attain the same rank as the male. The devaluation of female soldiers occurs at many levels, both symbolic and real. Particularly insidious are the sexual attacks: sexist jokes, groping, molestation, verbal abuse, rape. In virtually all armies, sexual assaults against women – and also against men who do not correspond to the accepted model of masculinity – occur far more frequently than in civilian life. Apparently, and much more so than in civilian life, there is social pressure in the military to prove oneself a “real man” by devaluing women. In a 1995 survey, over half – 55% – of US female soldiers polled said they had been sexually harassed, while for men it was 14%. However, the number of unreported cases is very high and very few cases end up in court. In wars, including the “War on Terror,” such cases regularly increase. According to the research of US Professor Helen Benedict, of the nearly 200,000 female soldiers deployed in the Middle East since 2001, almost three-quarters were sexually harassed by their comrades and almost one-third were raped.


However, in all other violent crimes, men are not only in the majority of perpetrators, but also of victims. Men kill, wound, rob, and insult other men first and foremost. Also, in many of today’s wars, it is predominantly men who die – contrary to common assumptions in feminist circles. One example is the massacre at Srebrenica where some 8,000 Muslim men were killed; another is the Kosovo War, where three out of four civilians killed were male. The Liu Institute (www.ligi.ubc.ca) suspects therefore in its “Human Security Report 2005” that “with the exception of sexual violence, men, not women, are more vulnerable to the major impacts of armed conflict.”
In armed conflicts, women frequently act as mediators between the warring parties. They frequently play important roles in peace alliances, maintain social networks and connections with the “enemy,” and are the first to resume such contacts once a conflict has ended. However this is not an expression of a particular biological predisposition toward peace, but rather a consequence of their social roles: Women bear the responsibility for children and other family members; since childhood, they have learned to mediate.

**Women’s Peace Groups**

For their 2002 study, “Women, War and Peace,” commissioned by the UN Women’s Fund, UNIFEM, former Finnish Defense Minister Elisabeth Rehn and current Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf interviewed war survivors and female activists in 14 war-torn countries. Their investigation took them on a journey to countless women’s peace groups that are little known internationally. Who knows about the activities of Avega, the Association of Rwandan Widows, which first met under a tree and which now operates a self-help network throughout Rwanda? Who knows about the Mano River Union Women’s Network for Peace, which has built a sort of regional women’s security council, in which women in government and in NGOs work together, from the former war zones of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone? “The systematic exclusion of women from official peace processes has harmful effects on the sustainability of peace agreements,” write the authors of the study, citing the agreements on Bosnia and Kosovo as negative examples. “If women are present, the character of the dialogue changes,” they say, because women insist on civilian priorities in restoring peace. In the case of Northern Ireland, former U.S. Senator George Mitchell attested to the fact that women’s massive political presence in the peace negotiations was “a significant factor in achieving the agreement.”


But women also belong to paramilitary groups and armed movements. Women took part in anti-colonial liberation struggles, such as in Algeria, or in guerrilla groups, such as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Even in intra-state conflicts in Africa – for example, in Liberia and Sierra Leone – women served as combatants, which in practice, however, often meant being sex slaves of the commanders. In such societies, women have been socially marginalized and discriminated against in post-conflict periods: Their legal status has been downgraded (e.g., Algeria), or their status as former combatants has not been recognized (e.g., Guatemala and Nicaragua).
Liberation Movements and the Battle of the Sexes

In liberation struggles new scope for action can open up for women. Thus, in 1973, the Sandinista Liberation Organization (FSLN) in Nicaragua started to admit more women into their ranks, until eventually about 30% of the guerrilla fighters were female. In the Mexican “Zapatista Army of National Liberation” (EZLN), the total proportion of women in all positions came to around 47%. The conflict situation thus leads, at least in part, to a shift in women’s roles: from caregiver to fighter. During the Zapatista uprising, women saw themselves as strengthened by their active role, and vigorously promoted their interests in the overall process of social change. They formulated a fundamental critique of patriarchy and did not want to wait around for haphazard improvements for women. Thus in the Zapatista uprising, the actors, both male and female, tried to connect the political struggle with the construction of civilian peace-building institutions.

Conversely, in the case of Nicaragua, we observe a tendency that can frequently be identified in post-war countries, namely the restoration of traditional gender relations: The emancipation of women was rolled back on many fronts, and former combatants and women’s groups were socially ostracized. In the fall of 2006, in an effort to secure the support of the Catholic Church for his re-election as president, former FSLN commander Daniel Ortega had the parliament pass a total ban on abortion. In the fall of 2008, he instigated house searches, legal proceedings, and smear campaigns against the Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres (MAM), the Cinco Research Institute, and abortion advocates.


Security Policy Is Gender Blind

In the modern conception of statehood, it is the nation state that can defend itself from attack from outside and that domestically, as the guarantor of security and peace for all its citizens, has a democratically secured monopoly on violence. From a feminist perspective, however, the positive role of the nation state in matters of security is not so straightforward. A look at the so-called private sphere plays a crucial role. It shows that violence against women is a globally persistent problem.

A survey of some 24,000 women in ten countries, published in November 2005 by the UN health organization WHO, found that in some countries one out of two women had experienced domestic violence. The study showed that the lack of equal rights was both the cause and the effect of this violence. Security that for half the population stops at their own door or when they step onto the
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War and Peace Have a Gender Dimension

street is no security at all. Thus, if domestic violence and other forms of sexualized violence are not perceived by governments as an elementary issue of security and democracy, then the magnitude of this privatized violence can lead to strife and insecurity defining the everyday lives of women, even in peacetime. By recognizing women’s rights as human rights, the state has an obligation to protect women from domestic violence.

Sexualized violence against women is, among other things, an expression of women’s lower social status. In times of armed conflicts, such seemingly private forms of violence increase and become a systematic component of warfare. Women are seen as a symbol of the “nation’s body”; they are raped, impregnated, and sexually mutilated as “war trophies.” Such acts of sexualized violence are used to humiliate and demoralize the “enemy.” Mass rape is used in many conflicts as a highly effective weapon of war. Men are also victims of this sexualized violence, but they say even less about it than women; the rape of men by men is considered “a taboo within a taboo.”

**Sexualized Violence in Eastern Congo**

Eastern Congo is currently probably the worst place on earth for women and girls, declared Yakin Ertürk, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, upon her return from a journey through the war zone in North and South Kivu in the summer of 2007. Sexualized violence, she said, has reached epidemic proportions and is perpetrated by all parties: the armed militias, the army, the police, and civilians. The atrocities are unimaginable and went far beyond rape. Women and girls were publicly penetrated with objects, often by male gangs who wanted to terrorize communities and totally destroy women’s physical and psychological integrity. Although the Congolese Parliament passed a law against rape in 2006, almost complete impunity prevails, especially for offenders wearing the uniform of the state, said Yakin Ertürk in her critique. Nothing has changed to this day – in fact quite the opposite: The new conflicts resurging in eastern Congo during the autumn of 2008 once again involved horrific forms of sexualized violence.

Source: www.monuc.org

Sexualized violence is not limited to the warring parties. Often foreign troops deployed in UN peacekeeping missions aggravate the problem of sexual exploitation – despite an official policy of “zero tolerance” toward sexualized violence as established under UN Resolution 1820 and elsewhere. In Cambodia, after the deployment of UN blue helmets, the HIV rate increased massively; in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, (forced) prostitution and trafficking in women increased greatly; in Liberia and other West African states, UN soldiers blackmailed under-age girls with food and soap in exchange for sex; a red-light district has been created in the Afghan capital of Kabul.
Resolution 1820

If we may consider Resolution 1325 to be the product of years of lobbying “from below,” then the text of Resolution 1820, passed by the UN Security Council on June 19, 2008, was initiated “from above.” The resolution was proposed by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the motivation being, perhaps, as some female observers speculate, her desire to make history. Whatever the personal motives, Resolution 1820 is a groundbreaking document, just as was Resolution 1325, to which it refers. It states with unusual clarity that “rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide.” It urges UN member states to fulfill their obligations to prosecute perpetrators and allows for sanctions against countries in which sexualized violence is perpetrated during armed conflicts. Above all, the possibility for the UN Security Council to adopt sanctions is a step forward from the “soft” policies of UN Resolution 1325. With this resolution, the UN Security Council, for the first time in its history, explicitly states that sexual violence against civilians “may impede the restoration of international peace and security,” and therefore is part of its area of responsibility. The UN Secretary General was asked to submit, by June 30, 2009, a report to the Security Council on data, problems, and possible progress in this area.

Some observers, however, see the resolution as not entirely positive. They note that it could be misused to justify military intervention. In the past such interventions have done women more harm than good. Along with the mostly male troops came always widespread (forced) prostitution and trafficking in women, rapes, rising HIV rates, and the sexual exploitation of minors. The blue helmets thus become part of the very problem they are supposed to solve.


For many women the violence does not end after the war. With the return of demobilized soldiers, domestic violence rises sharply in many post-conflict regions; traumatized and brutalized soldiers bring their experience of violence back home. Many ex-soldiers, who witnessed atrocities or even committed them, lose their moral mooring. In 2004, for example, after their return from Afghanistan, four fighters from a US Special Forces unit killed their wives. “You have to understand,” said a Macedonian man to the authors of the study Women, War and Peace, “I’m so stressed by the war. I can’t help beating my wife.” Therefore, it is not sufficient to demobilize ex-soldiers; they also have to be integrated socially; they must be offered treatment for trauma; they must be encouraged to find new civilian roles as men.
2 Conflict Prevention

Fear, Security and Peace

Peace is more than just the absence of war. The goal of a gender-equal and non-violent society does not pertain only to the military, but to civilian forms of dealing with conflict, especially through prevention. Here, the question of gender plays an important role. In public awareness, the issue of individual and public safety ranks far above the desire for peace and peaceful relations with others. If they feel threatened, people and states seldom respond rationally and non-violently. Security thus seems to take precedence over peace. This underlies states’ policies: Security policy can get along without strategies for peace, and even more so without a compelling conceptual peace policy; conversely, however, peace policy requires a security concept – although such a concept does not have to be based on military force. For political security concepts to be enforceable, it is of vital importance that there be a subjective and widespread sense of security. Fears and desires for peace are historically shaped and are strongly influenced by the media and political interests. The interaction among social awareness, media conditioning, political (re-)actions, and political legitimacy is clear from the attacks of September 11, 2001. This marked a turning point in the security situation for many people in the West. The same is true concerning the debates on whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, which, because of the ensuing military interventions by the United States and other NATO countries, led to real threats in their own countries.

Feminist Perspectives on Peace and Security

Whereas in hegemonic discourses, military intervention remains an option for conflict management, feminist discussions have developed comprehensive positive models for peace. They use the need for security and the experience of violence by individuals – in what only appears to be their private sphere – as a point of departure for their deliberations.

US scholar Judith Ann Tickner, in her book Gender in International Relations, argues: “The achievement of peace, social justice, and ecological sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination and subordination. Genuine security requires not only the absence of war, but also the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations.” She advocates
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a focus on the human need for community, solidarity and interdependence. Her concept of security assumes an “interrelationship of violence at all levels of society.” It is a dynamic concept in that it strives more for the creation of justice than for the creation of order. This includes gender justice because “replacing warrior-patriots with citizen-defenders provides us with models that are more conducive to women’s equal participation in international politics.”

Linking peace with the absence of every type of structural violence is a long-term goal, one difficult to attain, especially so in conflict regions and conflict situations. Yet it is not enough to perceive of peace as a sequence of initially negative and subsequently positive peace. “Negative peace” here means the absence of war; “positive peace,” by contrast, is a more general concept, one including individual security. Ways to achieve both gender justice and peace must, in any case, have to be taken into account from the very beginning.

“Peace and Security for All” is for us both a normative demand and a vision since, in traditional security policy, the female half of the population has hardly ever been considered. Achieving peace and security for women and men, boys and girls in their varied living conditions, however, is also a highly ambitious task. Feminist concepts of peace strive to meet this challenge: With Judith Ann Tickner’s utopia of a peace based on gender justice in mind, they demand that the norms of women’s rights and international law be strengthened and that the focus be shifted from escalation to prevention. This implies a conceptual realignment from a narrowly defined security policy to a peace policy. Feminists are consistently calling military institutions and concepts into question. This has also, in feminist discourse, led to controversies over women’s participation in the military.

Feminist concepts of peace are premised on the universal integration of a gender perspective into all spheres, as well as on the equal participation of women and men at all levels and in all processes, but especially in the context of security and peace policies. Since the beginning of the 1990s, with these demands, women activists have found wider public acceptance in the West than ever before. The fact that the transnational women’s movement changed its strategy with respect to the World Conferences on Women contributed greatly to this success. The self-perception of many feminist NGOs had evolved from one of oppositional criticism and monitoring to a strategy of lobbying and exercising concrete influence at international UN conferences. Christa Wichterich, for instance, identified the convergence of topics at NGO and UN debates at the 1994 Cairo UN International Conference on Population as a political novelty. Today most feminist NGOs no longer just criticize UN policies, they also try to actively shape them. This, however, was not uncontested within the feminist NGOs themselves.

Ultimately the efforts of many women’s NGOs culminated in the adoption of the Beijing Platform of Action at the UN World Conference on Women in 1995. This platform requires institutional mechanisms to promote the equal rights of women. States were called upon to “support mainstreaming of a gender
justice perspective in all policy areas and all levels of government.” As a result, the concept of gender mainstreaming was introduced into international policy making; the goal was to bring awareness of gender equality into the work of organizations.

**Gender Mainstreaming**

The strategy of gender mainstreaming was anchored in the platform of action adopted by the 1995 Beijing UN Conference on Women. As a result, this concept, which originated in the field of development cooperation, was able to attain worldwide relevance, because the ratifying states were obliged to monitor the introduction of gender mainstreaming and to develop a national plan for its implementation. In addition, the 1999 Amsterdam Revision of the European Treaty contains a binding directive for the member states to constantly keep equality in mind and to promote it actively.

**Definition:** Gender mainstreaming requires governments, state agencies, and institutions to assess what effects planned laws and projects will have on women and men. All measures should aim at equal rights and gender equality. „To mainstream” or “mainstreaming” means making something commonplace and self-evident, that is, introducing the equality of women and men as an issue at all levels. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defined gender mainstreaming in 1997 as the “process of assessing the effect on women and men of all planned actions, including laws and political programs. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences felt in political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and injustice is no longer perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender justice.“

Many countries adopted the English term “gender mainstreaming” instead of finding expressions in their own language – with some unintentionally comic results. The feminist activist Sanam Naraghi Anderlini reports about a workshop in Cambodia, in which “gender mainstreaming” was translated into Khmer. “The participants laughed their heads off, because the most suitable translation in Khmer was: Men and women jump into the river together.”

In practice, gender mainstreaming is often confused with the promotion of women and, because of this, is brushed aside or even deliberately boycotted by many government officials. Therefore, up to now, the results of gender mainstreaming in the ministries of UN member states are disappointing. And where states are fragile or have failed, as in some countries of the South or countries in conflict, hardly any government departments still exist and thus there is nothing left to mainstream.
Feminist Dilemmas

Feminist politics faces several dilemmas in the area of security and peace: Should the military be abolished or should it be reformed in a gender equitable way? Should feminists participate in decisions concerning war or exercise pacifist abstinence? Thus we find ourselves caught between a fundamental critique and a critique from within the system, between the demand to overhaul the system and the attempt to have it adopt tangible gender-sensitive approaches in the military-strategic domain, too.

Feminists disagree over the extent to which the military is capable of fundamental reform and whether it makes sense to demand equal representation for women at all levels of the military. Those who say it does make sense, argue that large sums of money are being poured into defense budgets and that women, in line with gender budgeting, should therefore participate in deciding how this money is used. Furthermore, they argue that this instrument of power should not be left to men and the exercise of military violence should not, as a matter of principle, be delegated to men alone.

Opposing this view is the strictly peace-oriented position. It assumes that the military is incapable of reform and should thus be abolished. This view advocates that, in order to prevent violence, all available energies and resources should go into conflict management. It does not deny that conflict is a routine part of human existence – whether at the level of states, organizations, or the family. It is not the conflicts themselves that are the problem, but that they are dealt with in a violent way.

This feminist-pacifist position faces a dilemma in situations of crisis and imminent danger. Many feminist pacifists analyze the causes of violent conflicts and pursue long-term civil peacekeeping and crisis prevention, yet they have accepted the deployment of military peacekeeping forces under a UN mandate, if, for example, such a mission may prevent genocide. However, in terms of realpolitik, this implies that as long as women are not an equal part of the military these peacekeeping forces will continue to consist of men only. Prostitution and trafficking in women, therefore, will continue to go along with the deployment of such troops. This is the starting point for feminists who do not advocate a fundamental pacifism.

Military and Gender in Conflict Management

With the end of the Cold War, military organizations such as NATO and the Bundeswehr have changed their roles. Although their importance has declined, a new range of duties has developed to legitimate their existence, and thus, they have been able to regain some of their hegemony.

Their duties today range from military intervention, mediation of conflicts, monitoring of human rights, and supply of humanitarian aid, to rebuilding societies in post-conflict countries. Military forces often also perform police and
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Civil duties in their areas of deployment. They thus affect economic and political life as well as gender relations in conflict regions. Meanwhile, the states sending troops and the UN often task military forces with the settlement and reconciliation of formerly hostile groups.

This gives the military highly symbolic significance in deployment areas and enormous political influence in shaping postwar societies. It requires skills and expertise in areas military personnel have hitherto received little training for. In crisis regions, the question of the role of women in society is quite often disputed among political, ethnic, religious, and cultural communities, and is thus part of the conflict. To reduce conflict and establish structures capable of maintaining peace, knowledge of local social, political and cultural relations is essential, as is a knowledge of the causes, history, and trajectory of the conflict, and of the dynamic of gender relations. Male and female soldiers must be trained in gender awareness if they are to be able to support local women in gaining equal participation in emerging democratic structures. In societies in conflict, soldiers must promote processes of deliberation on gender relations and stereotypes; they must bring a gender perspective into peacebuilding.

In addition to the military, many non-governmental players are active in zones of crisis and conflict. Boundaries between these two groups and their work are becoming somewhat blurred. On the one hand, the military assumes civil duties in conflict and crisis regions; on the other, it works increasingly alongside civilian organizations. Countries such as Germany frequently support various groups and transfer to them what used to be the task of the state. The problem is that the local people can barely distinguish between those providing civil assistance and military interventionists.

Civil Military Cooperation

Civil military cooperation (CIMIC) has played an increasingly important role since the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, theoretical deliberations about CIMIC are also taking place within NATO, the EU, and individual states, including Germany. However, the concept is currently only being implemented by nation states. From both military and civil perspectives CIMIC is a highly contentious instrument. Many endorse the fact that civil conflict management is given priority, indicating its wider acceptance, while others hold that CIMIC remains an instrument of the military. Thus in conflict regions, and where it is already deployed, the military remains the main actor such as in the course of so-called humanitarian interventions. As a result, it becomes difficult for affected populations to distinguish between the roles of civil and military organizations – something that can significantly hamper the reconstruction of a country’s civilian structures. Furthermore, the decision-making authority for CIMIC

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operations stays in the hands of the military. While civilians do play a key role in conflict management itself, they cannot influence the overall situation. CIMIC thus displays a fundamental imbalance between military and civil components. Such forms of cooperation let civil conflict management run the risk of losing its own peaceful profile and its preventive orientation. On top of this there is the lack of a gender perspective. Until now, CIMIC policies have been gender blind in respect to both their content and the participation of women.


The expansion of the military’s fields of action is creating a new set-up. Many civilian actors, both male and female, because of their own histories as conscientious objectors, feminists, or pacifists, keep the military at arm’s length. Yet mutual acceptance is a precondition for constructive cooperation and joint civil conflict management. Eliminating reservations about the other side is thus often the first priority.

Studies about the effects peacekeeping forces have on civil societies have produced ambivalent results. On the one hand, women’s NGOs and segments of the civilian population often highly appreciate their presence for stabilizing social life and developing security – for example, in Bosnia. Aid shipments for reconstruction and the normalization of life, which frequently go hand in hand with civil support, are likewise very well received. The stimulus the presence of international troops provides to the local economy is also seen as positive.

At the same time, developments are highly dependent on the gender policy of the respective military, a fact often given little consideration. Women’s organizations, such as in Bosnia or Kosovo, have been highly critical of the fact that they are excluded from democratization and reconstruction processes, and receive only limited access to educational programs. Instead, they are relegated to “women’s activities” such as hairdressing, knitting, and sewing. Here reform is urgently needed.

Gender Mainstreaming in Bosnia

“Gender mainstreaming is not a ‘soft’ issue,“ but “is at the core of security” – thus conflict researcher Johanna Valenius in her study Gender mainstreaming in ESDP missions. In 2006 Valenius and Judith Batt conducted a study for the Council of the EU, to determine whether those who participated in the EU’s interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo acted in a gender-sensitive manner. Their conclusions were devastating. Firstly, it was only the presence of the “internationals” that caused the sex industry
in Bosnia and Kosovo to flourish. Secondly, few female soldiers or police were deployed so that the EU missed the chance to provide a new role model: “If the EU itself does not practise what it preaches it loses credibility and effectiveness.” Male commanding officers justified this either by the lack of separate bathrooms and sleeping quarters, or by the “threat” posed by women to the cohesion of the troops. Others claimed that female soldiers would not be accepted in Muslim societies, although many armies in Islamic countries are familiar with women in the military. Thirdly, the EU was “unfortunately invisible” to local women’s groups and organizations of civil society; many women activists perceived EU staff as “arrogant and colonial.”


A military presence has very negative side effects: Prostitution, sexual violence, trafficking in women, and the incidence of HIV rise dramatically and impede the construction of a gender-democratic society.

The lack of gender expertise in the military is also responsible for many other abuses. Women and their needs are insufficiently addressed in the planning and construction of refugee camps. Women and girls, who in many cases make up 70-80% of refugees, often lack safe access to food, water, and toilet facilities. Not infrequently they are molested and even raped by men in unsecured washrooms and toilet facilities. According to a UN report, violence continues to rise in supposedly safe camps, where an average of 80% of women and girls are subjected to sexualized violence. To counter these effects of gender blindness in the military, feminist critics call for gender-sensitive conflict management. A solution could be to put together a UN force of mixed-gender police and military units. It would intervene on the basis of gender-sensitive conflict analyses and would have the necessary training, since within the military’s logic of violence, female as well as male soldiers can become perpetrators, if they are not adequately trained and educated in gender sensitivity. Its deployment would also have to be subject to clearly defined criteria and a resolution by the UN Security Council, which could only order such an intervention on condition that all other political means, diplomacy, and civil conflict prevention, have been exhausted. This, of course, will not resolve the basic dilemma faced by pacifist feminists, yet it could guide them in a pragmatic direction.
Female Soldiers as Perpetrators

Lynndie England, a private first class in the US army, gained sad notoriety in the scandal surrounding Iraq’s Abu Ghraib military prison in the spring of 2004. Photos smuggled out of the prison showed her in sexually charged poses, with a naked Iraqi prisoner on a leash, or laughing and pointing at the genitals of another prisoner. The cliché of the peace-loving woman explains why the media doubly scandalized the Lynndie England case: Not only does a woman inflicting torture and apparently enjoying it defy human rights conventions, it also defies common notions of femininity.

According to the New York Times, Lynndie England testified in a hearing, “We thought it looked funny. That’s why we took pictures.” The torturer, low in the military hierarchy, was condemned to a relatively high three-year prison sentence; her friend, the ringleader Charles Graner, got ten years in prison, and there were more convictions of soldiers in the lower ranks.

The only officer accused, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, was sentenced to an administrative reprimand. All attempts to prosecute former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have failed up to now. The higher and highest levels of the military, those who were co-responsible and had ordered the abuse directly or indirectly, remained unpunished, as did the soldiers who used “common” sexual violence to rape captured Iraqi women. The pornographic photos have provoked debates in the media as to whether it is particularly demeaning for an Arab man to be tortured by a woman. Heide Oestreich, a journalist for the German newspaper die tageszeitung, pointed out that the very idea confirms the subjugation fantasies of those who order or commit this type of torture. Only those who believe that wearing pink underwear is humiliating for a man would think of forcing prisoners to wear pink underwear, as is common in some US prisons. Therefore, the pictures reveal more about US soldiers’ violent pornographic fantasies concerning Arab prisoners than about the prisoners themselves.

Above and beyond this, the culturalist perspective can be dangerous: Well-intentioned presumptions concerning sensitivities undermine both the universality of human rights and the universal applicability of the Geneva Convention. Lynndie England’s symbolic emasculation of the enemy, as she smilingly pointed to the genitalia of an Iraqi prisoner, with a cigarette in her mouth, is a common military topos. Feminization as a form of abuse and degradation is a feature of all systems of militarized masculinity. Allowing a woman to sexually humiliate an Arab man leaves US masculinity intact. The Arab prisoner is rendered impotent, but not the American soldier, despite the pictures’ portrayal of male fear at the hands of a powerful female. The portrayal of a “reverse” rape affirms the military system, which is based on degradation of the “feminine.” Sexualized violence need not necessarily emerge from this system, yet it does, time and time again. This includes,
for example, the enormous red-light districts that regularly form around US bases throughout the world.


**Prevention Instead of Escalation**

Peace policy means to cultivate the prevention of violence in all crisis and conflict regions, and to strengthen the role of local peace activists. Traditional mechanisms of conflict management, such as reconciliation based on public negotiation and apology, or material compensation, play an important role here, but, explicitly or implicitly, often exclude women. Therefore traditional forms of preventing violence between populations or states are not sufficient. All social and government institutions, as well as families and schools, must be included in the process.

The large gap between early warning and early action is a major problem in prevention. In all conflicts there are early warning signs – reports by journalists, human rights organizations or politicians. But often there is insufficient political will to heed the warnings, or there are no efficient strategies for resolving conflicts. It is also difficult for conflicts that have not (yet) escalated to attract the necessary political and media attention. This is a fundamental dilemma of conflict prevention, since the sign of its success, after all, is precisely that it results in a “non-event.” Existing early warning systems are often ignored. Also, there are many different early warning systems, each with its own indicators. What these systems have in common is the lack of an integrated, or systematically integrated, gender perspective. The international community could step in to standardize existing approaches based on transparent criteria, analyze the specific situation in each region, and incorporate the gender dimension. Instead of investing in modern weapon systems, states should fund UN efforts to create an internationally uniform, but region-specific, early warning system.

The term “civil conflict management” encompasses a broad spectrum of civil groups, measures, and actions. These include the non-violent work of grassroots groups, work with local governments, trade unions, and churches, as well as diplomatic and humanitarian efforts, and efforts at crisis prevention in the context of development cooperation or as an intervention by foreign civil groups.

For a long time women’s role in civil conflict management has received little notice. This is due in part to the fact that women work primarily on a grassroots level: in self-help groups that deal with food supply, health, trauma care, and similar matters, but do not appear to contribute directly to conflict management. Such peacekeeping work by women, the establishment of communal social infrastructure included, is often viewed as exclusively humanitarian, and thus its true political significance is denied.
Frequently, however, it is precisely by meeting daily needs that women reach an understanding over and above the lines of conflict. Women tend to provide scarcely visible “routine peacekeeping services,” by providing mutual support and maintaining social relations. In this way they build bridges for reconciliation, which also can point the way for negotiations at the political level and in turn be affected by them.

On a national level, women’s groups attract attention through acts of civil disobedience, demonstrations, and lobbying. In doing so, they frequently make use of stereotypical images of mothers or “peace-loving women.” From time to time, “Women in Black” (www.womeninblack.org), widows’ and mothers’ groups in various parts of the world elicit great international attention, while other protest movements face stronger repression. Use of gender stereotypes as such can be strategically clever and subversive when women use traditional gender roles for their resistance work. This strategy, however, can be self-defeating if the outcome is that women remain imprisoned in these gender roles and no new, forward-looking role models for women are developed.

Taking Subversive Advantage of the Social Minority Status of Women

The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina’s capital, Buenos Aires, became world famous. Since 1977, they have been demonstrating every week with a silent march to the Plaza. They are demanding an explanation of how, where, and why their children and other relatives disappeared during the military dictatorship of the 1970s. As mothers, they are relatively socially respected and therefore enjoy some protection. The same goes for the Mutual Support Group in Guatemala, the Relatives of Prisoners and the Disappeared in Chile, and the Association of the Women of Srebrenica. In Russia, the Association of Russian Soldiers’ Mothers has undertaken the “demilitarization of social consciousness” and the “defense of civil society” through education. Sometimes, but not always, motherhood protects them from repression.

Israeli and Palestinian female peace activists met one another secretly in Jerusalem as early as the 1980s, when all political contact between Israelis and Palestinians was still banned. They were not arrested, since they were “only women,” and they likewise took advantage of this social minority status. Again and again the women of this “Jerusalem Link” offered joint proposals for conflict resolution to the public. In 2005 they founded the “International Women’s Commission for a Just and Lasting Peace Between Palestine and Israel” (IWC), which calls for the participation of women of both sides in the official peace negotiations.

Women often work alongside men to establish peace zones, as in the Philippines. In the Balkans, the Caucasus, Israel and Guatemala, they lead movements against conscription, or organize marches for disarmament and against violence. Countless examples show women’s potential in conflict management. Liberian women have collected small arms; Cambodian women have worked for non-violent elections. There is a long list of courageous women and their non-violent actions.

Many female peace activists come from self-help organizations and religious communities, but also from women’s rights movements. Their contribution to peace within grassroots organizations is just a small step away from active conflict intervention, namely from declared commitment to the fight against ethnic segregation, for human rights, and for peaceful coexistence. Women constructively prevent conflicts from escalating into violence. It is also important to keep in mind that these women engage in peacebuilding not because of their gender, i.e. because it is in their “nature” to do so, but as a result of the roles they have been assigned or have assumed, as well as traditional gender roles.

1000 PeaceWomen Across the Globe

Ruth-Gaby Vermot argues that the Nobel Peace Prize, instead of being awarded to more or less deserving statesman, as is the rule, should go to a thousand “peace women” from grassroots projects worldwide. In 2003, in Bern, the Swiss politician therefore founded the association “1000 Women for the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize,” now renamed as “1000 PeaceWomen Across the Globe.” As a member of the Council of Europe, she had, again and again, met women in the refugee camps of Bosnia, Georgia, and Chechnya, who, as she writes, “prepare the groundwork and carry out peacekeeping under extremely dangerous conditions. In difficult circumstances, they procure medication, search for missing persons, demand food for the hungry and fight for better accommodations for refugees. They instruct orphaned children, so as to distract them from their gruesome memories and the experiences of war and to provide daily routine and the courage to deal with life. They relentlessly condemn torture, murder, and disappearances, and use clandestinely taken photos to document the atrocities committed by warring parties. Against the will of the authorities, they hold silent vigils in public places. These are women who are the victims of war. They are the survivors, who are working for peace with all their might. Courageous, determined, and without regard to their own persons, they long for peace.” Peace queens instead of warlords – peace queens without power.

In 2004, the 20 international coordinators of the Bern Association nominated 1000 women from about 150 countries. The criteria for nomination of the women were as follows:

- Their peace activities are inherently non-violent.
Their work for peace is long lasting, sustainable, and transparent. The PeaceWomen assume exemplary tasks of leadership, notable for courage and a high sense of responsibility. Their commitment is solely dedicated to the cause of peace, and not to personal or political gain. Their work for peace reflects tolerance and respect for cultural and regional diversity and is always relevant to what the people need.

The Nobel Prize committee accepted the list of nominees, but in the end, once again, conferred the prize on a man, IAEA chief Mohamed El Baradei. The project was renamed “1000 PeaceWomen Across the Globe” and continued its work. From the standpoint of an expanded concept of peace and human security, it seeks to make women’s work for peace visible, to acknowledge it and to give it greater international support. It creates networks of women and organizations at the national, regional, and international levels, and reinforces their commitment so that a powerful, cross-border, and global women’s peace movement can emerge.

Source: www.1000peacewomen.org

Women contribute substantially to non-violent third-party civil interventions, namely by non-governmental actors and international organizations. They facilitate the work of reconciliation, perform monitoring services, and support education for peace and human rights. For example, the unarmed members of Peace Brigades International have escorted human rights advocates in Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, and other countries. The work of these mostly female peace brigaders demonstrates the effectiveness and great potential of civil interventions.

For many women, peace activism involves considerable risks, yet it does not ensure their participation in official peace processes. Also, if international organizations intervene in conflicts, women and their organizations are often passed over. Diplomatic personnel seldom pay attention to women’s groups and consequently they are neither included in decision-making processes nor recognized in their role as mediators.

An understanding of civil conflict management and peacebuilding that aims to achieve a culture of peace raises the value ascribed to women’s work on the local level. At a UN conference in New York in July 2005, the international network of non-governmental organizations known as the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) acknowledged the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts. A number of gender roles are explicitly listed in the GPPAC’s “Global Action Agenda.” It identifies women as the main guarantors of “structural prevention.” In its “People Building Peace” program, the GPPAC calls on governments, regional organizations, and the UN to devote more attention to women’s peacebuilding efforts. In so doing, it takes
up the worldwide demands of women’s organizations and takes UN proclama-
tions on women’s rights at their word.

Peace negotiations, of course, are extremely important, but they are only the
first step in a long process of establishing peace; without the participation of the
population at large, it is nearly impossible for this process to succeed. Only if
women participate equally in the peace process is it possible to ensure that they
will not be thrown back onto their pre-conflict roles – roles that often were one
of the causes of conflict.
In recent decades, many interstate and intrastate conflicts have required external intervention to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table. The UN and the UN Security Council are the only institutions authorized by the international community to intervene. The question of when, under what circumstances, and by what means an intervention will be carried out often reveals a problematic interpretation of security.

In the 1990s the use of military means to enforce human rights provoked major political controversies. After Iraq occupied Kuwait, the UN Security Council authorized the use of military force to protect the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq. Subsequent military interventions, such as in Somalia and Haiti, have been justified by the argument that unstable political systems and the associated violence in these countries endanger international or regional peace. Such interventions are fundamentally problematic. The concept of state sovereignty in international law stipulates non-interference in relations between states. The resulting focus on measures of military coercion also blocks out civil forms of intervention.

Measures of military coercion are only sanctioned by international law if they are authorized by the UN Security Council. Given the veto powers of the five permanent members of the Council – the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France – authorization entails extended negotiations. Generally it is declared to be a military intervention on humanitarian grounds.

Even if justified by grave violations of human rights and humanitarian crises, a military intervention will violate the prohibition against violence and the non-interference clauses of the UN Charter. However, in response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the “ethnic cleansing” in former Yugoslavia, national sovereignty and the rights of intervention by the UN and the international community were reinterpreted under the concept “Responsibility to Protect.”
The Concept of Responsibility to Protect

The concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) imposes on states the obligation to protect their populations according to the “human security” concept against massive human rights violations such as massacres, ethnic cleansing, and violations of women’s rights such as sexualized violence in war and mass rapes. The concept of “Responsibility to Protect” was first used in a report by that name, published in 2001 by experts of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was convened at the initiative of the Canadian Government. State sovereignty, according to the commission, includes obligations to protect – i.e., the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.

The “High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” established by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his efforts to reform the UN, subscribed to this concept and recommended in its report, published in 2004, that military intervention only be used “as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.” The High Level Panel expressed the view that only the UN Security Council can authorize military intervention, and only according to the following criteria:

1) All diplomatic, political, and economic means for averting conflict must be exhausted (“last resort”).
2) The “seriousness of threat” must then be assessed to determine whether the use of force is appropriate.
3) The intervention must be appropriate to the degree of the threat and may not have other intentions (“proper purpose”).
4) Robust peacekeeping missions must be suitably equipped so as to be able to actually attain their assigned goal (“proportional means”).
5) Military operations may not lead to worse consequences than non-intervention by the international community (“balances of consequences”).

Measured against these criteria, the interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan would not have been justified. There is only one case that meets all the rules: the genocide in Rwanda.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan incorporated these proposals into his report on UN reform (In Larger Freedom). The heads of state present at the 2005 World Summit on the Millennium Development Goals also adopted the concept – but without the five Measured against these criteria, the interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan would not have been justified. There is only one case that meets all the rules: the genocide in Rwanda.
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UN Secretary General Kofi Annan incorporated these proposals into his report on UN reform (*In Larger Freedom*). The heads of state present at the 2005 World Summit on the Millennium Development Goals also adopted the concept – but without the five criteria for military intervention. At the beginning of 2008, new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon appointed US law professor Edward Luck as Special Advisor for the Responsibility to Protect. The same year, at a presentation at the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, Luck indicated that he, too, wanted the concept to be understood very restrictively: A military intervention is justified only as a means of last resort in the case of genocide; his focus clearly is on prevention.

The newly developed norm of international law, however, is not without inconsistencies. On the one hand, it refers explicitly to the non-governmental concept of “human security”; yet the UN Security Council, whose five permanent members still understand security not as human security but as state security, are permitted to decide on military intervention. So far, they have always acted according to national interests and not according to how intensely a population is being attacked. The Chinese government, for example, has frequently prevented a stronger crackdown in Darfur because of its oil interests. Like the Russian government, it does not support the concept of responsibility to protect.

With or without “R2P,” the danger remains that interested states will justify military interventions on (allegedly) humanitarian grounds. Thelma Ekiyor, Executive Director of the West Africa Civil Society Institute in Accra, stated at an international symposium on R2P in November 2007 in Bonn that in Africa the US-led “War on Terror” has had the effect that the responsibility to protect is in danger of being held hostage by the US.

Women’s rights can also be misused to legitimize military interventions – as happened in Afghanistan. The fundamentalist Taliban, who ushered in the most misogynistic regime in the world, were at first supported by the US and promoted in Pakistan’s mosques. Only after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the media and the public became aware of the massive human rights violations Afghan women had to suffer. President George W. Bush, as well as German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, justified the intervention that began on October 7, 2001, on the basis of the oppression of Afghan women.

We are thus faced with a very ambivalent situation, since the abuse of women’s rights may be used to try to legitimize military intervention. On the one hand, human rights are only taken seriously if they are protected worldwide; on
the other, this protection should follow from a human rights perspective that encourages action at an early stage and with a view toward prevention.

As a result of international lobbying by women’s organizations, the final document of the 1993 UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna expressly emphasized the principle that “women’s rights are human rights.” As a consequence, genital mutilation and domestic violence – i.e., gender-specific violations of human rights – were placed on the international agenda. Two years later, the UN Conference on Women in Beijing affirmed the right of women to live without violence. In 1994, a UN “Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences” was appointed. During the 1990s, sexualized violence was defined as a crime under international criminal law, starting with the rulings of UN tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and then as statutory offences under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Article 7 of its so-called Rome Statue lists rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, and other comparably severe forms of sexual violence as crimes against humanity.

In the past decade, the United Nations has continued to promote women’s rights in many other areas as well. Meanwhile, plans of action exist for all major areas such as eradication of poverty, health, education, and trade. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was trend-setting for the area of peace and security. In recent years, the UN Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission has repeatedly addressed the problems of forced prostitution and trafficking in women. Several UN bodies have investigated sexual assaults on female refugees by UN employees participating in peacekeeping missions. In March 2005, the UN Secretary General drew up a report on this for the General Assembly, and the Security Council issued an unprecedented condemnation of sexual abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel at its session on May 31, 2005, and reinforced this with Resolution 1820 in June 2009.

The final document of the 2005 world summit included a variety of demands by women activists in the areas of education, employment, gender justice, empowerment, and human rights. Especially noteworthy are the sections on “The Role of Women in the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts”: “We stress the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding. We reaffirm our commitment to the full and effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. We also underline the importance of integrating a gender perspective and of women having the opportunity for equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security, as well as the need to increase their role in decision-making at all levels. We strongly condemn all violations of the human rights of women and girls in situations of armed conflict and the use of sexual exploitation, violence and abuse, and we commit ourselves to elaborating and implementing strategies to report on, prevent and punish gender-based violence.”
This reaffirmation of earlier declarations demonstrates that success can be achieved on a normative level within the framework of the United Nations. Still, formulating a norm is a long way from ensuring adherence to it in practice. Therefore, additional reforms taking into account a gender perspective are needed within the UN. There are still no concrete proposals on how a gender perspective can be integrated in the event of external interventions.

In military interventions, one of the major weak points in the authorization of peacekeeping missions has been and continues to be the design of the UN mandates themselves. The complicated negotiation process in the UN Security Council as well as between it and the UN Secretariat has often caused mandates to be formulated in vague terms, raising high expectations that can never be met due to a lack of funding, personnel, and logistics. Moreover, given the narrow scope of the mandates, troops in affected areas can react only poorly to changing needs. Gender policy objectives can only be implemented if they are defined in the mandate – which currently is not the case. The mandate formulation process thus also urgently needs reform on this point. The financial requirements associated with each mandate must also be specified precisely, since they directly affect the mandate’s type and scope of implementation. And to re-emphasize the point: Before resorting to military measures of coercion all other non-military forms of intervention must be exhausted.

The High Level Panel also contains very few gender-specific demands. Although the High Level Panel and the final document of the 2005 world summit do refer explicitly to Security Council Resolution 1325, they make no recommendations as to how the resolution should be implemented. Point 4 of Resolution 1325, for example, states that the role and contribution of women should be reinforced by promoting their work as military observers, civil personnel, civil police, and as human rights and humanitarian personnel for UN field missions. In 2008, however, only 2.1% of military personnel were female, although an all-female police contingent of 103 Indian women did provide security in the Liberian capital, Monrovia. Out of 30 worldwide peacekeeping missions, there was only one, the UNMIL in Liberia, that was led by a woman, Denmark’s Ellen Margrethe Løj. Just eleven peace missions had full-time gender consultants; eight had feminist gender consultants; and seven had “Gender Focal Points.” Deploying more female UN Special Envoys and increasing the number of women in peacekeeping missions would be both simple and effective strategies to achieve the objectives of Resolution 1325. The political will of the countries sending troops is a vital precondition for success.

Because of major political differences between the UN member states, so far only a very small portion of the High Level Panel’s reform proposals has been implemented. One of these proposals, adopted by the UN General Assembly in its session of December 20, 2005, was to establish a Peacebuilding Commission. However, in gender questions, so far neither the Peacebuilding Commission nor the newly formed Human Rights Council have made truly significant progress, although some starting points for feminist demands are expressed in the various position papers for UN reform.
The Peacebuilding Commission

The Peacebuilding Commission, newly created in the course of UN reform, is supposed to create a kind of UN institutional memory with respect to reconstruction in post-conflict countries. The commission’s task is to collect the experiences, know-how, and best practices of reconstruction and to better coordinate the local, national, and international participants.

NGOs and also the High Level Panel had requested that the commission be entrusted with conflict prevention, in the sense of providing early warning. This, however, was rejected by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. An institutional base for prevention has yet to be created. Also, and despite demands by women’s organizations, Resolution 1325 is not part of the institutional basis of the commission. Thus crucial chances were missed to strengthen the aspect of gender in guiding reconstruction processes and to provide better opportunities in public institutions for those who are being discriminated against on the basis of gender.

The results achieved by the Peacebuilding Commission, which began work in June 2006, are therefore modest. Its organizing committee consists of 31 members who change every two years: seven members of the UN Security Council (including permanent members), seven members of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), five members from among the largest contributors to the UN, five from the countries that supply the most personnel for peacekeeping missions, and five from countries with experience in reconstruction. The real work, though, gets done in the country committees. Since the end of 2008, these committees have dealt with reconstruction processes in Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and the Central African Republic (in part by video conferences with local partner organizations).

This also gave a new impetus to discussion about whether a new UN organization for women should be established, with increased staff and financial support. The initial impulse for this came from a man, the Canadian feminist Stephen Lewis. In an impassioned speech on UN reform in July 2006 in Geneva, the former UN Envoy for AIDS in Africa pointed out the low budget of the UN Women’s Fund, UNIFEM, and insisted that half of humanity should no longer be fobbed off with mere crumbs. It is, “after 50 years of passivity and paralysis, high time” to set up an organization with an annual budget of at least one billion US dollars, he said. At an informal meeting of several UN member states in September 2008 in New York, various models were discussed. The EU, Scandinavia, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as several NGOs, supported the idea of combining previously existing women’s departments into a new, stronger entity that encompasses the following organizations: the UN Women’s Fund (UNIFEM); OSAGI (Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues); DAW
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(Division for the Advancement of Women), and INSTRAW (International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women). Other countries wanted to leave everything the way it was or thought that a new department under the UN Secretary General would be better.

Security as the EU Understands It

Changes in the international power structure and in security policy debate has led to changes in the European Union’s concept of security policy. The “Peace Power Europe,” as the EU has viewed itself since its inception, has become a new, global determinant of power and order. The EU Security Strategy reveals a profound change in the EU’s priorities and goals. The EU no longer defines itself exclusively as a civil power, but also as a military power.

Since the end of the Cold War, two events have especially affected the EU’s foreign and security policy: first, the wars in the Balkans from 1991 to 1999 and the wrong conclusions drawn from them; second, the “War on Terror” after September 11, 2001, led by the U.S. with the involvement of Western states. In the wars in former Yugoslavia, the EU’s political class had no idea how to oppose the murder, rape, and expulsion of hundreds of thousands, and, from its failure, drew the wrong conclusions. There was no political consensus about the causes of conflict and strategies to solve it, but instead the opinion that the EU had failed due to a lack of military capability. Because the US government completely dominated NATO’s 1999 Kosovo War and withheld important military information from its European NATO allies, a large number of European politicians believed that the EU must become a military power itself in order to be able to deal with the United States “on an equal footing,” as the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder put it at the EU summit in the summer of 1999.

The concept of “expanded security policy” was chosen as the foundation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was first expressed in the EU’s common security strategy, published in late 2003 under the title For a Secure Europe in a Better World, and then later in the draft EU Constitution, meanwhile changed to the “Lisbon Treaty.” Even though it has not yet taken effect, the line of approach planned by the EU elite can certainly be deduced (see below). The concept of “expanded security” does have a global thrust, but in contrast to the UN concept of “human security,” it remains subject to the narrow interests of the nation state or the EU. Anything posing a potential threat to the stability of Western-oriented states is considered a security threat. The threat, therefore, does not have to be real.

The EU formulated its first common foreign and security policy in December 2003 in a strategy paper entitled A Secure Europe in a Better World, and then spelled it out in its Headline Goal 2010, adopted in 2004. Five principal threats were identified: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure in specific regions of the world, and
organized crime that develops in its wake. Environmental catastrophes, disasters, and epidemics were relegated to secondary importance. This weighting of threats contrasts with the threat scenarios that were developed in the UN context. The EU’s threat scenarios are, to be sure, a reaction to the concept of “human security,” but also and primarily to the United State’s more strongly militarized concept.

As in other EU documents, the paper lacks any causal analysis of the threats it formulates. Although it does not lie within the scope of such a document to perform such an analysis itself, it should articulate clear criteria for civil as well as military interventions. As a precondition for any kind of intervention, there should be causal analyses that also consider gender relations. This is completely lacking, and in the EU’s security strategy, women figure only as objects in need of protection, such as in connection with trafficking in women. They are not conceived of as active subjects.

The EU Security Strategy is thus completely gender blind. Also, the requirements of UN Resolution 1325 are only touched upon indirectly, including in a document of the EU Council Secretariat from 2005 (“Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of ESDP”). There the Council Secretariat suggested some measures to increase the effectiveness of EU missions, including the establishment of “Gender Focal Points” and gender training for mission personnel.

The EU strategy includes military intervention not only to protect EU territory, but also in other regions of the world. Although “no new threats are to be addressed by purely military means,” and “preventive security policy” should play an important role, it is still evident, by comparing appropriations for military and civilian conflict management that the emphasis is on the former, even though the EU is the world’s largest financial donor for civil crisis prevention.

**EU Missions Abroad**

The focus of EU interventions undertaken so far within the framework of CFSP and ESDP has been on civilian missions. But the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force and a joint EU armaments agency threatens to shift the focus to military actions. At the end of 2008 there were 13 ongoing EU missions abroad, including three military ones in Bosnia, Chad, and off the Somali coast, plus two paramilitary ones to reform the security sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea-Bissau. Nine were completed, including three military missions: one in Macedonia and two in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as one paramilitary mission in the Sudanese region of Darfur. The civilian missions were mainly policing operations, including in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Palestine. EU civilians have also been stationed in Georgia since the Russia-Georgia War of August 2008, as well as at the Rafah border crossing in the Palestinian Gaza Strip.
The EU has yet to stipulate clearly when and how to proceed with military interventions. Differing positions emerged in particular in 2003 during the Iraq War. The current EU strategic concept also leaves open questions about joint decision-making and intervention procedures; it simply calls for “greater coherence” based on “common action.” *Headline Goal 2010* stipulates that these questions should be clarified in a binding manner by that year.

It is already clear that EU forces will be called upon to perform a greater combination of military and civil tasks. Military forces are being asked to feature “interoperability” as a major new quality “to enhance the effective use of military capabilities,” allowing them “to work together and to interact with other civilian tools.” This process depends to a large degree on the type of cooperation between civil and military organizations. If EU military forces do in fact take over tasks that, in the past, were handled by civilians, we may expect a progressive militarization of crisis and conflict management. Already today, civilian-military cooperation is dominated by the EU’s military institutions and staff. The staff of EU High Commissioner for Foreign Policy Javier Solana is also trying to subordinate the civilian domain to the military.

If the EU wants to realize its claim to be a force for civil power and peace, one that has drawn the right conclusions from two bloody world wars, then this is the wrong priority. The priority must be civil, and civilians must maintain political control in all areas. The EU should strengthen its global influence as a civil power whose armed forces are available to a reformed UN as police for the enforcement of international law. The priority would therefore not be military coercion, but civil law enforcement in the context of political solutions arrived at diplomatically.

The EU’s new security policy agenda has emerged partly in agreement and partly in competition with the USA. The US government under Clinton and Bush urged the EU to accept military obligations within the NATO framework, both inside and outside Europe. It is therefore to be feared that the combination of partnership with and competition between the EU and the US will lead to an arms race. It is thus all the more important that the EU reflects on its founding vision of peace and commit itself clearly to the UN Charter, which bars every war of aggression and requires a UN mandate for any type of intervention. Contrary to widespread belief, this is not the case so far. In the relevant documents, the EU up to now commits itself to act only within the framework of the UN. Yet there is a backdoor to carry out military interventions, if necessary, without a mandate from the Security Council.

The Treaty of Lisbon, also called the “Reform Treaty,” adopted at the EU summit in the Portuguese capital in October 2007, was supposed to replace the EU draft constitution, which, however, was rejected in two referendums in France and the Netherlands. By the end of 2008, the treaty was supposed to be ratified by all member states so that it would take effect at the beginning of 2009. After the Irish referendum derailed this plan in June 2008 – Ireland is the only EU member state in which any amendment to EU treaties requires a plebiscite – the
EU was initially at a loss. Still, by the end of 2008, the parliaments of most other EU member states had voted on the treaty, probably in the hope that the next referendum in Ireland would produce the “right” result.

The Treaty of Lisbon

Most of the Treaty of Lisbon corresponds to the rejected draft EU constitution but the structure is more complex and the text more difficult to understand. Critics see this as deliberate deception of the citizens. Compared to the existing EU treaties, notably the Treaty of Nice, there are, among others, the following changes:

- The European Parliament is given more weight and more responsibilities. However foreign and security policy are exempt, i.e. the parliament has no say on war and peace.
- The semi-annually rotating EU presidency is to be abandoned. A future President of the Council of the EU, who serves for two and a half years, should ensure greater continuity.
- In the EU Council, instead of the previously required unanimity, majority decisions will be possible.
- The EU is to have a foreign minister („High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy“) who is to be appointed by the EU Council and is also Vice President of the European Commission (thus wearing “two hats”).
- An additional protocol is agreed upon, “Ensuring free and undistorted competition” – i.e., a neoliberal economic structure.
- The EU member states are thoroughly committed to rearmament, through their involvement in the European Defence Agency. Art. 42 par. 3 of the Treaty states: “Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as `the European Defence Agency`) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defense sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.”

Source: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_de.htm

If the Treaty of Lisbon were in effect, there would be a structural conflict with the German constitution, the Grundgesetz. According to Articles 24 and 87a of the Grundgesetz, German armed forces may only be deployed to defend the
country or as part of a collective security system, and German soldiers may only be sent on a foreign mission following a resolution by the German Parliament. There is a danger that pressure from the EU and the federal government could be so great as to make an independent decision by parliament impossible.

The EU Security Strategy and the Treaty of Lisbon reveal a profound change in the EU’s priorities and aims of action – and this in the absence of widespread public discussion and social consensus. The EU no longer defines itself exclusively as a civil power, but also as a military power.

If a foreign and security policy is to be credible and gender-equitable, priority must be given to the UN system and the acceptance of the provisions of the UN Charter. The UN must be recognized as the sole decision maker for all crisis prevention and conflict management operations. This would substantially validate the EU’s commitment to international law. At the same time, the EU should view its mission of peace in terms of its “responsibility to protect” and participate in civil interventions to establish the rule of law in third countries, in line with the “right to intervene.” UN Resolution 1325 must also be implemented, particularly as it corresponds with EU directives on the equality of women and men and with gender mainstreaming. In the discussion over revamping the UN Security Council and expanding the number of permanent seats, EU member states must also strive to secure a joint seat, in order to broaden the EU’s democratic legitimation, and in line with European unification and the express will of the European Union to play a strong role in the world.

**Paradigm Shift in German Peace and Security Policy**

The EU security policy represents a paradigm shift from a policy of defense to one of intervention. This, in turn, affects policies of the member states. In Germany the armed forces are currently being restructured to become a rapidly deployable intervention army, the “Quick Reaction Force,” which has been deployed in Afghanistan since July 2008. Here, too, the focus is on “the fight against international terrorism.”

Back in December 2002, the Defense Minister at that time, Peter Struck, provided a vivid description of this change, when he stated, “the security of Germany will also be defended in the Hindu Kush.” Thus the Bundeswehr, too, is blurring the boundaries between civilian and military missions and extending its sphere of operations into civilian areas, development and foreign policy. This, with the problematic consequences described above, happens against a background of a lack of expertise in gender relations. All of this is evident in the deployment of German troops in Afghanistan.

German soldiers in Afghanistan make up part of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), and the German KSK (Special Commando Forces) was active in the US-led “War on Terror.” The former were part of the NATO mission for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, while the actual activities of the...
KSK were unclear. Not even a parliamentary inquiry was able to shed light on this situation.

The violence Afghan women experience both at home and in public is as extreme as before. Yet the predominantly male troops deployed still have little awareness of it. They are not in the position to enact gender-appropriate measures that also enlist men to support women’s participation in the public arena or to protect threatened women. If Afghan men publicly beat their wives on the street, the Bundeswehr is explicitly not allowed to intervene.

Women’s rights advocates or journalists who are being threatened are not protected by the German ISAF troops. The intervention forces also lack instruction that would raise their awareness. These issues are not part of the training for foreign deployment and are definitely not part of the deployment strategy.

Civil-Military Cooperation in Afghanistan

At the end of 2008, there were more than 52,000 soldiers from 40 nations in Afghanistan. Germany, with about 4,500, was the third largest provider of troops. Of the 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), two were led by Germany, namely those in Kunduz and Faizabad. These civilian-military units are comprised of some 50 to 500 persons and are always led jointly by a member of the military and a civilian. They are supposed to provide security and to facilitate reconstruction. But they also serve the propaganda purpose of demonstrating the viability of such civilian-military cooperation by building schools and drilling wells.

In practice, however, there are massive problems:
1. Afghanistan does not need a large number of wells but rather large-scale infrastructure – old dams and irrigation systems have to be fixed.
2. Soldiers are not trained as development aid workers.
3. They remain on site for eight months at the longest – much too short a time to identify local problems.
4. Development activity is indirectly militarized.

In October 2007 and October 2008, in two statements by the Association of German Development NGOs (VENRO) (www.venro.org) that were backed by representatives of organizations working in Afghanistan – Caritas, German Agro Action, medico, medica mondiale, and others – the commingling of civilian and military aid in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams was criticized: “The mixture of civilian and military tasks has resulted in ever greater risks for NGOs that strive for neutrality. In recent years, some NGOs have suspended their aid in Afghanistan – among other reasons because the military’s utilization of the humanitarian mandate means that aid can no longer be provided independently.” The authors of the paper, therefore, argue vehemently for a change in reconstruction strategy: priority to civilian
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construction; ending Operation Enduring Freedom; ISAF to focus on its
core mission of peacekeeping and disarming the militias; return of ISAF to
UN authority; separation of military deployment and civilian emergency
and development aid – disband the PRTs; consistent protection of girls and
women.

The fact that women have now joined German combat units has had little
or no effect on traditional patterns of masculinity in the German armed forces.
This seems to be a foregone conclusion, as, from the very beginning, the objec-
tive was that equality of the sexes will be achieved when combat units consist of
15 % women... The “critical mass” of a 30 % “minority” required to bring about
qualitative changes is not even pursued.

An exception to the mostly military German security policy is the Action
Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding” passed
in 2004 by the coalition government of Social Democrats and Greens. It focuses
on civil conflict management, with a strategic emphasis on promoting the rule
of law and democracy in crisis countries. It expressly mentions the necessity of
women’s participation “in power structures and their full inclusion in all efforts
surrounding crisis prevention and conflict resolution“ as a prerequisite for the
peaceful reconstruction of a constitutional democracy. It calls for measures
to increase the participation of civil society and especially gender sensitive
non-governmental organizations. In contrast to German military, the Action
Plan has included gender-sensitive behavior as a target for the training of police
forces. This at least is a positive starting point for gender-oriented approaches;
it also makes reference to UN Resolution 1325 and stipulates that civilians and
their expertise are being used. Yet without adequate funding, none of this will
have any impact.

**Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention**

On May 12, 2004, the coalition cabinet of Social Democrats and Greens
approved the Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and
Peacebuilding. This is one of the few inter-agency foundational documents
on German foreign and security policy. As a cabinet resolution, it ranks
above defense policy guidelines, which are acknowledged by the cabinet
but apply only to the administrative domain of the Ministry of Defense. This
also explains why the Action Plan is not a complete project, but rather a
collection of 163 actions to be implemented in the next five to ten years.

The Action Plan incorporates the gender perspective in its discussion of
women’s participation in power structures. The Action Plan thus strategi-
cally promotes democracy and the rule of law in crisis countries, explicitly
mentioning the necessity of women’s participation “in power structures and their full inclusion in all efforts surrounding crisis prevention and conflict resolution,” as a prerequisite for the peaceful reconstruction of a constitutional democracy. In the chapter on the role of civil society, it also advocates support for gender sensitive non-governmental organizations. In contrast to military training programs, the Action Plan lists “gender sensitive behavior” as a criterion for the training of police. Thus a gender perspective does find expression in individual demands of the Action Plan. On the other hand, the Action Plan lacks a gender perspective in its underlying expanded notion of security, as well as in the chapter on culture and education. It also fails to address ways of implementing UN Resolution 1325 at the federal level.

Further difficulties arise regarding implementation of the Action Plan. To complement it, the German Foreign Ministry created a Council on Civil Conflict Prevention under its own supervision. It consists of the commissioners responsible for civil crisis prevention from all relevant ministries. This council formed an advisory board to act as an intermediary between the federal government and civil society. Its members include representatives from non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and business circles (Siemens, BASF, Deutsche Bank), yet women’s organizations and experts on gender awareness are not represented. Since the advisory board is not itself a policy making body, it depends on close cooperation with the government and parliament. The council itself is made up of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defense. Due to conflicts of interest among the ministries this makes coordination difficult. In reality, the Action Plan’s demand for coherence meets considerable resistance because of differing interests and organizational cultures. Furthermore, the government is expected to present a report on the Action Plan every two years. It is supposed to provide information on the ministries’ and the council’s implementation of the Action Plan’s recommendations.

Institutions of Civil Conflict Management

The general problem is that the effect of civil conflict management with respect to preventing violent conflict can hardly be verified. There are a number of projects and institutions in the field of civil conflict management in Germany – little known to the public – which have had a tremendous impact with comparatively little funding, thus saving enormous costs. These include:
ZIF: The Center for International Peace Operations in Berlin was established in June 2002. ZIF’s core mandate is to build a pool of about 1,000 German civilian professionals for short- and medium-term deployment in peacekeeping and election monitoring missions conducted by the UN, EU, and OSCE. With its combination of recruitment and training of personnel, deployment support, and analysis, ZIF is unique.

ZIVIK: The project for Civil Conflict Management is organized by the Institute for Foreign Relations and funded by the Foreign Ministry. ZIVIK serves as an intermediary for non-governmental organizations working in the field of civil conflict management, to facilitate their access to public funds. It has supported Peace Brigades International in Colombia, which escorts human rights activists; a dialogue process with moderate Islamists in Tajikistan; demobilization and reintegration projects; and democratic media. In 2005, the activities of the Institute for Foreign Relations received approximately two million Euros in funding.

ZFD: The Civil Peace Service was founded at the initiative of peace groups and has been supported by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development since 1999. Qualified experts support local partners in crisis regions, promoting mutual understanding at the lower and middle levels of society.

DSF: The coalition government of Social Democrats and Greens resumed federal funding of peace research. The German Foundation for Peace Research supports research projects and the work of young scholars. In 2003, the DSF, for the first time, received a million Euros in funding from the Defense Ministry.

CIVPOL: The participation of German police in UN and EU international peacekeeping operations has become an important, if relatively unknown, permanent mission. In 2008, Germany sent 245 police to support international peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, Sudan, Liberia, Georgia, Ukraine, Bosnia, Palestine, and Afghanistan.

GTZ: The German Society for Technical Cooperation has been commissioned by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development to set up a project for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management. Its focus is on elaborating concepts and instruments for crisis prevention, conflict management, and peace development, as well as their application to development cooperation.

That the Action Plan has little actual political significance is made clear by its funding. In 2007, the Green parliamentary group estimated that spending on the military compared to that for civil conflict management, at 3.2 versus 24 billion Euros, i.e. the latter was almost eight times higher – and that considering that some rather doubtful items were classified as expenditure for civil conflict management. There were new developments, however: For the first time that year, the Council on Civil Conflict Prevention, received a budget of ten million euros that was used for small reconstruction projects in northern Afghanistan.

In the summer of 2008, the federal government submitted its second report on the implementation of the Action Plan. More interesting than its content was what was not reported. A study on cooperation between the ministries somehow vanished, apparently because the results showed significant deficiencies. In particular, because of departmental bickering and jurisdictional squabbles, cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the Development Ministry has been difficult for many years. The working group on Economic and Civilian Crisis Prevention had stopped functioning in late 2007, according to the report, because its goal as determined by the Action Plan, to define “the role of the private sector in promoting peace,” was “difficult” to achieve. The reason for this is not mentioned in the paper: In many cases the private sector actually exacerbates conflicts, for example by exporting weapons, or by European industrial fishing fleets that ruin West African fishermen. The report also says nothing about the actual weakening of structures for civil conflict management, although the international situation requires the opposite. In fact, even the military is increasingly voicing its demands for civilian measures. Indeed, the former crisis manager of the Foreign Office resigned in early 2008 because he felt that he was not getting enough support from the higher-ups. At the Ministry of Defense civil crisis management is still poorly supported. In the 2006 White Paper of the Ministry of Defense, the Action Plan is seen as just one “building block” among many.

**The OSCE as a Model for Peace Policies**

The activities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) can serve as a starting point for an effective peace policy. This organization’s great merit is having prevented war, but this has received little political recognition; on the contrary, in recent years, the OSCE has been increasingly relegated to political obscurity.
The OSCE (www.osce.org)

Its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was converted, from 1973 to 1975, from an instrument of the Cold War to one of cooperation between East and West; it achieved a series of agreements on human rights, economic issues, and the mutual monitoring of military maneuvers. At the beginning of 1995, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the CSCE was renamed the OSCE. It is comprised of 56 member states: all the European states, the former Soviet Union, the USA, and Canada. Decisions can be made only on the principle of consensus. The OSCE’s conception of security is based on cooperation and excludes the use of coercion and violence. Its headquarters is in Vienna. Its bodies and institutions include the Council of Ministers (annual meeting), the Permanent Council (at least one weekly session), the Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE field missions, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media.

Between 1990 and 1995, i.e., during the period of the first and second Balkan wars, and to some extent afterwards, the OSCE established more than 20 peacekeeping missions, which have successfully prevented crises and mediated in conflicts. The OSCE has carried out forward-looking peace missions from the Baltic to southern Georgia, composed of representatives from government and civil society. According to the OSCE, its work is based on a three-dimensional concept of security, which encompasses political-military, economic-environmental, and human security. It lists early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-crisis follow-up as specific fields of action.

After the end of the Cold War, Russia especially pursued the goal of transforming the OSCE into a new European security organization to replace NATO. This, of course, this did not succeed. Instead, the OSCE committed itself to supporting the transitional states of the former Soviet Union in building democratic structures. This policy now meets with increasingly stiff opposition from the governments of Russia, Belarus, and some Central Asian countries. They have accused and still accuse the OSCE of interference in their internal affairs. There have been repeated attacks on OSCE representatives, including the media. OSCE missions have been obstructed and, in Chechnya, they were even forced to retreat. When the OSCE cancelled its observer mission to the Russian presidential election of March 2, 2008 due to “restrictions by the Russian authorities,” the Russian government reacted angrily, saying this was not “acceptable.” Other states such as Uzbekistan joined in with threats against the OSCE.

Sources: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung; www.pbp.de; www.wikipedia.de
Like many international organizations, the OSCE is subject to tremendous budget constraints – measured against the objectives it is supposed to achieve. Although the OSCE budget was increased from the 21 million Euros it was allocated in 1994, it has slightly declined since 2000. In 2008 it amounted to 164 million Euros. This is about 0.5 % of Germany’s defense budget. One reason is that non-events such as the prevention of the escalation of violence do not attract much media attention.

Back in June 2000, the OSCE decided on an *Action Plan for Gender Issues*, that is, before UN Resolution 1325 of October 2000, which is similar in content. This document shows quite precisely that non-violent and non-military involvement in missions can only succeed if the gender dimension is part of the missions and is taken up by civil society in the conflict areas. The tangible practice of the OSCE has lagged behind its *Action Plan* in many respects. Change occurs very slowly. However, the OSCE has to deal with getting its missions authorized by the member states, and then to set them up and maintain them on site.
Peace and Security for all people require sustainable concepts. Wars and violent conflicts can only be successfully prevented if human rights are protected worldwide and if women participate equally in the planning and implementation of peace and security policy.

Promoting non-violent forms of conflict resolution and preventing violations of human rights in conflict situations were stated objectives of the Action Platform of the Beijing Conference on Women. To achieve this, the governments of the signatory nations, as well as international and regional organizations, are to adopt measures to ensure that gender concerns are taken into account when developing training programs in the field of international humanitarian law and that relevant staff are instructed about human rights. Staff involved in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian aid should also receive such training, with a view to preventing violence against women.

The UN Security Council also believes that a gender perspective has to be an integral part of training and education for military as well as police peacekeepers. Points 6 and 7 of Resolution 1325 request the “Secretary General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights, and particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements … into their national training programs for military and civil police personnel in preparation for deployment and further requests the Secretary General to ensure that civil personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training.” And it “urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical, and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts…”

Various international organizations have meanwhile recognized the importance of gender aspects in their work in crisis areas, have developed specific measures for further training, and have published the relevant materials, mostly online. One positive example is the “Gender and Peace Support Operations” training course developed in 2000 by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the British Department for International Development (DFID), which was also posted online. This course is designed for both civil and military personnel on peacekeeping missions, and suggests gender
sensitive approaches as well as providing information about treaties on human rights and women’s rights.

Building on these materials, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) developed the “Gender and Peacekeeping Operations In-Mission Training” program. This course was designed for participants in UN foreign operations, as well as for military personnel and civil police at the national level. It was tested in a pilot project and then optimized. For UN peacekeeping missions, personnel are now trained on site by mobile “Mission Training Cells” staffed by military instructors. DPKO course material has been included in the introductory program for new peacekeeping personnel in operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Eritrea (UNMEE), East Timor (UNTEAT), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).

Practical Gender Training in East Timor and Eritrea

“During the testing of the gender training material in East Timor and Eritrea, the trainer found that he/she did not have enough current, context-specific information on the conflicts in those countries and the peace missions there. For this reason it was decided to open the gender-training sessions to both the military peacekeepers and the civilian population, so that the local men and women could provide their analyses and stories. Some local politicians, including mayors, and local women and men participated in the training. The trainer found that the most profound learning occurred when local civilians participated in the training sessions along with the military peacekeepers. This gave all participants an idea of how the conflict and peace mission had affected them and the role of gender within those experiences and structures. The trainer also found that often this was the first time that military peacekeepers had actually spoken with local people and heard their perspectives. This realization shows an important and useful way of developing an understanding of gender issues within the peace mission and the host society.”

Cited in McKay and Mazurana (2001), Raising Women’s Voices for Peacebuilding.

The UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) also offers three-day seminars for civil staff entitled Training for Civilian Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations on the Special Needs of Women and Children in and after Conflict. These have so far been held once each for UN missions in Bosnia (UNMIBH), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNTEAT), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Burundi (ONUB), and Cambodia.

Gender activists in the United Nations do not want, at least in theory, to keep on providing separate courses on gender, but would rather like to make a gender perspective part of all programs for further training. They view further training
as an essential instrument of gender mainstreaming, to develop “gender sensitivity” and “gender expertise.”

The development of gender expertise rests on three levels of education and further training: motivation, knowledge, and skills. The first task, therefore, is to build motivation, namely for participants to view equality as a goal of their own work. This requires an awareness of (potentially) discriminatory structures. The second step is for them to become knowledgeable about gender issues in their own area of work. Third, the participants must acquire the skills to act in a way that promotes equality.

Most of the gender training programs currently available have been designed as separate modules, with an emphasis on raising awareness and acquiring knowledge. For gender mainstreaming to be implemented in a sustainable manner, however, it is precisely the third step that is needed, namely the skills to promote gender equality in practice, regardless of whether those skills are applied to providing initial humanitarian assistance, re-establishing “public order” and structures of the state or civil society, or instituting long-term development cooperation.

UN member states such as Germany are far from having achieved the goal of thoroughly integrating a gender perspective into the education and further training of military and civil peacekeeping personnel. In 2004, in its first report to the UN Secretary General on implementing Resolution 1325, the German government stated that it had complied with the request by the Security Council to provide voluntary financial support for gender sensitivity training, by funding the DPKO project on “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations” in 2002.

The first and also the second reports of the German government (2004 and 2007) on implementing Resolution 1325, show, however, that DPKO materials have yet to be adequately used in Germany. The government, according to its own statements, does use gender training at the international and EU levels, yet scarcely in Germany itself. The only training program it mentions is a working paper published in 2003 by the Center for Internal Leadership of the Bundeswehr, entitled Making Decisions and Taking Responsibility – Conflict Situations in Operations Abroad. The seminar material is intended to promote “confident behavior on the part of male and female soldiers” in crisis situations abroad. The concept of gender conveyed here and reproduced in public, is as a marginal feature of training (if it exists at all), suggesting very deficient implementation and a lack of gender awareness on the part of most of those responsible.

However there are good examples in Germany of active groups such as ZIVIK, which are making efforts to integrate gender into their regular education and further training programs. However, the criteria ZIVIK provides for evaluating projects remain gender blind.
Dealing with Differences Peacefully – Feminist Ways to Peace

The future challenge to peace-oriented policy-making lies in establishing a permanent basis for addressing differences by non-violent means, nationally and internationally. Peace-oriented policy must address three basic dilemmas: the “dilemma of equality” (equal treatment of unequal subjects perpetuates inequality), the “dilemma of difference” (unequal treatment of difference institutionalizes the difference discriminated against), and the “dilemma of identity” (group identities exclude those who are not identical). As such, we agree with Mary Kaldor’s conclusion in her book on the “New Wars”: “Exclusionist policy must be countered by alternative, future-oriented cosmopolitan strategies that bridge gaps between global and local concerns and re-establish legitimacy on the basis of democratic, inclusion-oriented values.”

Peacebuilding personnel have to be aware of these incongruities and asynchronies if they want to transform violent relationships into peaceful ones. This requires that democracy be understood in a way that allows for differences, yet without biological determination of gender roles or the exclusion of certain groups, which would violate their human rights. This in turn requires a carefully cultivated political “space between us,” as described in the conclusion to a study by Cynthia Cockburn on cooperation among women in Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland.

These women’s groups emphasize their differences as opposed to glossing over them; they directly address political differences in the group; they avoid profiling of women and men according to supposedly natural characteristics; they avoid polarization; they acknowledge injustice committed in the name of ethic segregation; and they set themselves clearly defined goals. The group process thus becomes a locus for generating precisely this democratic space, as Cockburn writes:

“A good deal of effort therefore goes into structuring a comfortable democratic distance between us, as individuals in marriage, as collectivities in a multicultural city, as nations sharing a world. The space has to afford an optimal distance between differences, small enough for mutual knowledge, for dispelling myths, but big enough for comfort. It has to be strong enough to prevent implosion, an eruption of differences into rape, silencing or annihilation. But it also has to be flexible enough to permit differences to change their form and significance.”

It is this “space between us” which is one of the most challenging but at the same time indispensable conditions for peace based on gender equality. When conflict escalates, it can only be maintained with effort, but such micro-processes form the basis for a culture of conflict that is democratic, gender-equitable, and non-violent. Resources must be devoted to promoting and maintaining it, in order to prevent the need for high-casualty, hazardous, and costly military operations as the means of conflict management in the first place.
Strengthening International Law and International Peace Norms

The ban on violence in international law must be reinforced at all levels. This includes reforming the UN, for which, with all its imperfections, there is no alternative. The UN Security Council must be reinforced and democratized as a body for preserving world peace. If a conflict arises, all preventive, political, economic, and diplomatic means must be utilized in full to avoid an escalation of violence.

If these do not succeed, there must be clearly defined criteria and objectives for military operations that may only occur with a Security Council mandate. From a human rights perspective – as described above – the international community is called upon to address human rights violations taking place in the context of violent conflicts or failing states at a very early stage. For this purpose, there is a wide repertoire of measures available to the international community, even though, more often than not, none of these are implemented. A military intervention, even when carried out with a Security Council mandate, is always a poor solution, because it is not preventive, but is employed only after human rights have already been gravely violated. Moreover, violence always tends to generate new violence. Nevertheless, there must be clearly defined criteria for military interventions. One of these criteria is that participating states should provide mixed-gender troops specially trained for these purposes. Expertise in gender and intercultural issues, as well as experience in civil conflict management, are indispensable.

We entirely reject operations without a UN mandate, whether by NATO or the projected European deployment force. In addition, emphasis must be placed on civil peacekeeping measures. These too must be performed by personnel trained in programs of which gender sensitivity is a central feature. Every UN mission should strive to fully implement Resolution 1325. This in turn requires action plans to be implemented in both the individual states and within the UN. Civil society organizations with proven gender sensitivity must be commissioned to develop these plans. An action plan on the international level could also serve as an example for similar action plans in individual member states.

Overcoming a Culture of Violence

To establish security following a violent conflict, the culture of violence must be thoroughly transformed by gender policy and feminist perspectives. The state plays a two-sided role in this multi-layered process: On the one hand it provides security, yet its gender blind structures also pose specific potential threats to women and girls.

When violence escalates, the integrity of the state often disintegrates. Two of the greatest challenges in conflict management are to disempower violent perpetrators and to restore a functioning rule of law. These objectives are particularly important for women, due to the fact that sexualized violence increases in
violent contexts. It is thus in women’s interests to restore the state’s monopoly on violence and to penalize each individual act of violence.

Although the state can act as a guarantor of security for women, it can also be a source of insecurity. Every security strategy, therefore, must be examined for its effects on gender and population groups. Security must include legally guaranteed protection against sexualized violence, which means passing the requisite legislation, training police forces, sensitizing judges, and setting up shelters and hotlines. Both genders must have opportunities to address the traumas of war and sexualized violence. Victims of violence require special support, while perpetrators must be publicly prosecuted within the legal system, to transform the culture of violence in a postwar society. Prerequisites for this include a broad concept of security, sensitization of the police and judicial staff, better protection for victims, and support for witnesses who testify against perpetrators. The most important allies in this process are the local initiatives that address the subject of sexualized violence – a taboo in many societies – in culturally and politically sensitive ways. Different needs must be addressed when demobilizing male and female combatants. There must, for instance, be specific re-integration programs for women and men, to counteract social ostracism should they not wish to revert to their old gender roles.
5 Summary Requirements for All Levels of Peace and Security Policy

Our fundamental demand is that a gender perspective be incorporated into all documents and concepts as a central category for sustainable conflict prevention, and that all participants take it seriously. To do so, it is indispensable to use gender specific data, particularly for conflict analysis.

Credible and just gender strategies for conflict prevention and a peace-oriented security policy can only be pursued successfully if adequate funding is available. This means dramatically increasing the funds for civil crisis prevention at the expense of armaments, i.e., the defense budget. Otherwise, instruments such as national action plans remain hollow declarations of intent. This means drawing up a Gender Action Plan, which must contain the following points:

I. Basic Demands for Foreign and Security Policy:

1. Prevention instead of intervention; civil measures instead of military measures.
2. A security concept true to the understanding of “human security” and human rights, and which incorporates the gender dimension.
3. Participation of all social groups in peacekeeping and security policy considerations, concepts, and measures. This also includes the participation of civil society organizations in discussions and decisions about postwar regimes.
4. The development of a gender index for foreign and security policy: This means criteria for a gender sensitive security concept, for identifying violence against women, and for including women on missions and in democratization processes.
5. Regular collection and strict application of gender specific data, e.g. for the analysis of conflicts and their protagonists.
6. Regular international meetings of experts on war-related sexualized violence.

II. Measures Required in Crisis, Conflict, and Postwar Regions:

1. Enshrining equality for women and men in peace treaties and postwar constitutions, including quotas for women.
2. Comprehensive gender mainstreaming in all peacebuilding operations in crisis regions.
3. Establishment of institutions to monitor human rights in postwar societies.
4. Trauma sensitive medical and psychosocial support for survivors of sexualized violence in wars, which especially promotes the potential of women and girls.
5. Reintegration programs for ex-combatants, to support men and women in re-entering civil life.

III. Demands That Must Be Implemented in the United Nations Reform Process:

1. More appreciation and promotion of institutions in the UN system that pertain to women’s rights by combining them into one new UN entity for women’s policy.
2. Stronger institutional base for crisis prevention within the UN system of preventive action.
3. Passage of a clear, binding list of criteria, explicitly stressing human rights, for the use of military force as a last resort, defined within the concept of the “responsibility to protect.”
4. Establishment of a monitoring body, in a suitable position within the UN system, that oversees the implementation of Resolution 1325, with participation of NGOs and civil society representatives.
5. Development of standards, unequivocal deadlines, and a list of criteria for evaluating the implementation of UN Resolution 1325. This should also include a precise definition of what “appropriate” participation by women means in different countries; what evaluation criteria should be used to judge whether the measures introduced have succeeded in the way envisioned by the resolution, etc., as well as a targeted campaign to increase the readiness to implement the insights acquired.
6. A supplementary provision to UN Resolution 1325 requiring that women hold at least 40% of all offices and positions in peace processes, and applying this percentage to all UN leadership positions as well.
7. Establishment of pools of national and international gender sensitive experts to implement Resolution 1325 in postwar countries.
8. Formation of a UN trust fund to support women peace activists throughout the world.
9. Sending UN observers to postwar regions to monitor postwar processes and the humanitarian situation.
10. Consistent compliance with existing behavioral codes as well as strict prosecution in the event of violations, including the abuse or exploitation of the local population by UN members.
11. The consistent implementation of Resolution 1820 by monitoring, annual implementation reports, and non-military sanctions against countries in which there is sexualized violence in war.

IV. The Following Must Be Implemented on the EU Level:

1. All (military) interventions carried out by EU troops must be authorized by a UN mandate.
2. Establishment of a disarmament agency or a civil conflict prevention agency and giving up the plan to build a defense agency.
3. Establishment of a permanent budget for immediate non-bureaucratic aid to traumatized women and girls, men and boys in or from crisis regions who have fled to the Federal Republic of Germany or another EU country.

V. The Following Must Be Done in Germany:

1. The Germany shall resolutely pursue a human rights agenda. Governments that systematically violate women’s rights shall be promptly apprised of these abuses by all diplomatic means, in close cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Economics. If necessary, economic relations shall be terminated.
2. The budget for gender-equitable civil conflict prevention and management (e.g., for implementation of national action plans for “Civil Crisis Prevention”) shall be substantially increased with respect to the defense budget, in order to achieve a credible peace-oriented security policy.
3. Aid for institutions in development assistance that work in war, crisis, and postwar regions shall be conditional on their demonstrable gender expertise.
4. Reports shall be submitted at two-year intervals on civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding, providing detailed information on how the ministries have implemented the objectives and recommendations of the action plan for “Civil Crisis Prevention.” If objectives are not met, the reports shall list the reasons and lay out precise measures for prompt achievement.
5. Gender sensitive studies on foreign and security policy and conditions in individual countries shall be systematically promoted.
6. A national action plan shall be promptly drawn up for the thorough implementation of UN Resolution 1325. To expedite this, meetings of national and international experts as well as relevant networks shall be appropriately supported.
7. A national monitoring office shall oversee the implementation of Resolution 1325. Civil society groups shall be involved in the monitoring.
8. Members of the Bundeswehr and civil society organizations serving Germany shall only be sent on foreign missions if they can demonstrate gender exper-
tise. The percentage of women in peacekeeping forces (and in all other relevant assignments) shall be increased to 40 or 50%.

9. The materials developed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to prepare national personnel for foreign missions shall be thoroughly utilized; equality-oriented and gender competent education and further training courses shall be provided for military, police, and civil peacekeeping personnel. The deployment of civilian peace experts shall be particularly encouraged and increased. The evaluation, from a gender perspective, of all education and further training courses shall be ensured.

10. Consistent strategies shall be developed to counter sexualized and domestic violence in crisis regions and postwar societies. Networking between them and corresponding domestic initiatives (e.g., for German soldiers) shall be promoted.

11. German soldiers as well as military and civil personnel who violate behavioral codes and laws while on a foreign mission, especially by acts of sexualized violence, shall be strictly prosecuted.
APPENDIX

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Books


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GenderKompetenzZentrum of the Humboldt-Universität Berlin: www.genderkompetenz.info
A global action agenda for the prevention of violent conflict: www.gppac.net
Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org/de
Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen: www.ifa.de/zivik
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Further Reading

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Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (1999): Women and Armed Conflicts, Oslo.
UNIFEM (2004): Getting it right, doing it right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, New York.
Essays


Further Weblinks

cfd – Christlicher Friedensdienst: www.cfd-ch.org/index.html
1000 Frauen für den Friedensnobelpreis: www.1000peacewomen.org
Feminist Peace: www.feministpeacenetwork.org/
Women’s Security Council: www.frauensicherheitsrat.de
Jerusalem-Link: www.batshalom.org and www.j-c-w.org (The Israeli Bat Shalom Centre and the Palestinian Jerusalem Center for Women both campaign for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Jerusalem Link is connecting the two organisations)
Medica Mondiale: www.medicamondiale.org
NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security: www.peacewomen.org
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition: www.niwc.org/
Owen-Frauennetzwerk: www.owen-berlin.de
The Bridge: http://tx.technion.ac.il/~ada/the-bridge.html
Women for International Peace and Arbitration (WIPA): www.wipa.org
Women in black: http://balkansnet.org/wib/links.html
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF): www.wilpf.org/
The strategies of international security policy have significantly changed since the end of the Cold War, as have the challenges posed by international terrorism and the increase of global inequality. In women’s policy and feminist networks, interest in foreign and security policy ideas has also grown in recent years. Not least because of the commitment to and adoption of UN Resolution 1325, for the first time in the history of the United Nations a requirement was adopted, binding under international law, respecting the participation of women in decisions about war and peace. Finally: Armed conflicts are related to unjust gender relations. In this publication the Gunda Werner Institute in the Heinrich Böll Foundation presents a detailed position paper to contribute to the international debate on peace and security policy. The paper is based on a 2006 discussion paper, which has been extensively updated and revised.