Global India Dialogue Series

"THE INDIAN DIASPORA IN AFRICA: EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND CHALLENGES TO REALISATION"

Lecture discussion

by:

Professor Ian Taylor
St. Andrews University, Scotland

Organised by:
Organisation for Diaspora Initiatives (ODI), New Delhi
(www.odi.in)

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HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG INDIA
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HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG
INDIA
EDITOR’S MESSAGE

The economic rise of India in 21st Century led it to its proactive engagement of the world in economic, diplomatic, and Diasporic areas. The advent of Narendra Modi Government in India added special emphasis on the engagement of Indian Diaspora across the world. Many other countries like China, Brazil, Mexico, and Poland had launched similar aggressive Diaspora engagement policies. Thus, Diaspora has emerged as one of the prime movers of India’s foreign policy. It has become important for not only India but for other countries as well to engage their Diaspora to promote bilateral relations.

Given huge presence of Indian Diaspora globally, it is crucial to understand the relative importance of Indian Diaspora in foreign policies. Africa is one region, where India and China are trying to engage and leverage their Diaspora presence to augment their bilateral relations with the region and both countries are using their competitive strength to increase their influence in the region, which is engagement of civil society and benign Diasporas.

Prof. Ian Taylor, who is one of the world’s leading researchers on China’s engagement with Africa, is researching the comparative importance of Diaspora in engagement of India in Africa. His lecture was on Indian Diaspora and Diaspora policy of India from non Indian, non Diaspora perspective.

This interaction is a part of the series of international dialogue which Organization of Diaspora Initiatives (www.odi.in) is organizing to interact, analyze and understand the determinants, dimensions and impact of India’s global engagement on foreign policies and domestic developmental issues and role of Diaspora in that. The programme is being supported by Heinrich Boll Foundation.
ABOUT ODI

Organization for Diaspora Initiatives (ODI) is working to understand the status and role of Diasporic communities across the globe—both in domestic and international context. It maps the emerging roles, networks and operations of different Diasporic communities as a resource in the international civil society space as well as in the host and the home countries. ODI interacts and links various Diasporic communities to ensure a voice and place for large number of communities who feel disempowered under a water tight state based international system. ODI attempts to understand Diasporas by comparing and contrasting their experiences. In this comparative framework, Indian Diasporas, which developed its networks and organizations in the last two decades, is a prime focus of study, both in historical and contemporary perspectives. The head office of ODI is located in New Delhi, India. It has several sister organizations registered in many countries. It includes people and organizations of Indian and non-Indian origin. It has a biannual refereed research journal Diasporas Studies published by Routledge, U.K. It organizes and participates in conferences, seminars and other interactive activities of Indian and other Diasporas which lead to the developments in terms of Diaspora policy, role of Diaspora in the development of India and role of Diaspora in global linkages of India. It is actively engaged in researching and publishing books, journal and occasional papers on Indian and other Diasporas. It takes up comparative research projects on different aspects of Diasporas, including on Diaspora policies of different countries, utilization of Diasporas as resource by the host countries, the role of Diasporas in development and nation building and the impacts of globalisation on Diasporic networks, organisations and movements. ODI was started by a group of academics, policy makers, media and business professionals which is a non-profit, non-political, educational and cultural organization. ODI also has an MOU with Ministry of Overseas Indians, Government of India, as a research, publication, conference and knowledge partner on Indian Diaspora issues.
THE INDIAN DIASPORA IN AFRICA: EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND CHALLENGES TO REALISATION

Ian Taylor

Indo-African relations can be traced to ancient times (Beri, 2003) and Africa is host to a long-established Indian Diaspora (a smaller long-established African Diaspora also exists in India (see Karmwar, 2010)). In the contemporary period a new set of dynamics have emerged that has rapidly expanded relations (Taylor, 2012). This has been relatively recent, with 2005–06 dubbed ‘Our Years of Africa’ (Suri, 2008: 2). India’s trade with Africa has doubled in recent years, from $24.98 billion in 2006-07 (Business Day, January 28, 2013) to an expected $90 billion in 2015 (Confederation of Indian Industry/WTO 2013). There are diverse motives for the variety of Indian actors currently establishing themselves in Africa. From the Indian state’s perspective, energy security has been seen as paramount (Bava, 2007: 3), as has the ambition to be taken seriously as an important global player (Sahni, 2007: 21-3). This stems from the celebratory rhetoric around India’s supposed emergence as a Superpower (see Nayar and Paul, 2003; for alternate views, see Mundkur, 2011; Drèze and Sen, 2013).

There is no doubt that New Delhi’s politicians harbour ambitions to take up a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Jobelius, 2007: 4). Equally, as India’s economy continues to grow, Indian business interests have ambitions of themselves to expand their commercial empires. With Africa being described by Manmohan Singh as ‘a major growth pole of the world’ (Times of India, May 24, 2011), the continent is seen as providing political support to India as well as important opportunities for new investment sites and new export markets (Agrawal, 2007: 7). Consequently, ‘economic activity between Africa and Asia is booming like never before’ (Broadman, 2008: 97). The discussion about an Indian Diaspora in Africa needs to be placed within this context. Indeed, the changes in India’s political economy and the progressive commercialization of Indian foreign policy with regards to Africa are the keys to understanding the current interest in the Diaspora in Africa.

The study of Diasporas is a growing academic field, with India’s being no exception. Before discussing any notional Indian Diaspora however, some key challenges need to be flagged up. Firstly, the very idea of an Indian Diaspora in Africa is often cast as obvious and common sense and analysis then starts from a rather unreflective position. Groups are classified without any rigorous definition of what exactly is a Diaspora. Given that the majority of so-called Indians in Africa left the sub-continent before partition, an “Indian” i.e. a Republic of India Diaspora cannot be unquestionably assumed. Secondly, the sense of community is often assumed when no such thing may exist. Such a homogenizing conception of a Diaspora obscures inner stratification of the groups in terms of class, caste, ethnic and regional origins. The Indian Diaspora is no exception and in fact, caste and religious differences are profound. Thirdly, an a-historical perspective is often adopted which assumes the permanence of the transnational groups’ identity, regardless of the period during which migration occurred or how long the Diaspora has been in existence. A ready identification
with India is often assumed, although why this should be the case is rather strange. No-one would assume that an Australian or American of British descent holds an emotional attachment to Mother England (far from it!), so why India should be different is rather curious. These issues will all be discussed below.

Clearly, the overseas Indian community is not homogeneous. At least six phases of outmigration can be distinguished:

(i) merchants who went to East Africa or South-East Asia before the 16th century;
(ii) migration of various groups (traders, farmers) to neighbouring countries (Ceylon, Nepal, Burma etc.);
(iii) indentured labourers to colonial possessions in the West Indies, Fiji, Mauritius or Natal; as well as migration through middlemen to Malaya;
(iv) migration of skilled/semi-skilled workers after the Second World War towards the developed countries (primarily the United Kingdom);
(v) migration of contract workers to the Persian Gulf;
(vi) contemporary migration of Information Technology workers to developed countries (primarily the USA) (Lessinger, 2003).

Indo-Africa relations: some general comments

In light of much current Indian rhetoric about its relations with Africa, the struggle for Indian independence inspired African nationalism and is a powerful legacy that continues to have redolence today—even if only at the state level. However, whilst Gandhi may have set down the moralistic underpinnings for Indo-African relations, it was Jawaharlal Nehru who provided a political framework, with a strong element of South-South solidarity infusing India’s early post-colonial foreign policies. Central to Nehru’s ambitions in this regard was the ‘gradual creation of friendly, cooperative, and mutually constructive relationships between India and the various countries of Africa’ (Park, 1965: 350). Nehru in fact referred to Africa as a ‘sister continent’ (Sharma, 2007: 20) and Africa became important in Nehru’s vision for a fairer and more equal global system (Naidu, 2008: 116).

The epochal Bandung Conference of 1955 was in fact organised by India and other Asian countries to promote economic and cultural cooperation between Asia and Africa and oppose colonialism and neo-imperialism. The subsequent Non-Aligned Movement, with which Nehru became heavily associated, reinforced his position as ‘the post-colonialist leading voice against imperialism, colonialism, domination, interference or hegemony’ (Bhattacharya, 2010: 65).

However, because of the constraints of the Cold War and Superpower chicanery (and, equally, India’s relative material poverty), such aspirations were largely confined to the realm of rhetoric. Indeed, it has not been until the post-Cold War period and India’s exponential economic growth that Indo-African relations have moved substantially forward, accompanied by a greater ‘pragmatism and a sober realisation of new challenges facing both India and Africa as they get ready to take their place under the global sun’ (Singh, 2006).
Equally, the current interest in the Indian Diaspora globally, as well specifically with regard to Africa, may be seen as post-Nehruvian, a point I will return to below.

Officially, Indian foreign policy roots itself in Nehruvian inclinations for multilateralism and South-South solidarity (Agrawal, 2007: 7). According to some commentators, this has stimulated India’s long-held interest in UN peacekeeping (Chiriyankandath, 2004: 200) and Indian peacekeepers have now been occupied with over forty UN peacekeeping missions (Jobelius, 2007: 8), much of these in Africa. New Delhi is enthusiastic in its support of the UN system which often stands in contrast to much Western practice (Bava, 2007). Using its leverage, New Delhi has at times sought to open up a certain amount of political space within multilateral institutions where developing countries might cooperate (ibid.) and as part of this strategy, has underwritten the financial costs necessary for such cooperation (Hurrell and Narlikar, 2006: 7). Motives for such efforts come from the fact that:

[T]he Indian economy is becoming highly reliant on foreign markets for its survival and growth...India’s growth in its exports of goods, services, and people create a big stake for India in sustaining open markets globally. Multilateralism is being seen as an important means for India’s economic management, especially in dealing with major powers (Ollapally and Rajagopalan, 2012: 98)

To reflect its growing status, India seeks a number of goals, for example, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. As ‘an observable manifestation of friendship is the pattern of UN votes,’ (Alesina and Dollar, 2000: 46) it is likely that some political interest by is aimed at strengthening bonds with countries in the expectation that benefits will accrue. This tactic paid off in 2006 when the chair of the Council of Ministers of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) threw the weight of the 15 member sub-regional group behind India’s bid to be a Permanent Member of the UNSC. Pranab Mukherjee, India’s External Affairs Minister, later declared at the India-Africa Summit in 2008 that ‘the support of Africa for reform and expansion of the UN Security Council, in both permanent and non-permanent categories, is critical’ (Mukherjee, 2008: 59).

The mutual desire by both India and the AU to reform the UN Security Council and secure permanent seats has been a consistent theme in recent Indo-African relations. This is not only linked to the demand to secure their “rightful places” in world affairs, but also in the case of India, would alleviate the inconvenience and inferiority that India feels vis-à-vis China. India’s diplomatic strategy cannot today be said to be grounded in an idealism predicated purely on South-South solidarity and contemporary India’s foreign policy is more pragmatic than previous incarnations. Although New Delhi continues an interest in non-alignment and notions of South-South solidarity, the focus these days is very much on the importance of national interests, particularly economic in nature. This is linked to a wider move within India away from statist economic policies to those more in line with neoliberalism. ‘In the dominant discourse—both in India and internationally—the latter policy shift [towards neoliberalism]
is credited with having put India on a fast growth path for the first time in its history' (Desai, 2007: 785).

In this way, India might be said to be following in the economic (and hence political) footsteps of China. Indeed, ‘since 1991…India has begun to liberalise its economy in a belated effort to achieve the growth and investment seen in China, as well as to stave off bankruptcy’ (Alden and Viera, 2005: 1088). A surging economy within India requires new markets and new sites for Indian investment opportunities and the diaspora has been identified as one agent of this. Competition with Chinese companies has stimulated recent Indian energies in parts of Africa and as Brahma Chellaney, of the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi asserted, ‘India is massively playing catch-up to China in Africa, and only in recent years is it trying to engage the continent in a serious way’ (Sydney Morning Herald, May 25, 2011). The diaspora in this sense is viewed by many as providing New Delhi with a notional advantage over Beijing.

The Indian Diaspora in Africa: History and Origins
As mentioned, contact between India and Africa is long established and Indian trade with the eastern African seaboard is ancient (Prasad, 2003). Colonisation led to the incorporation of the Indian subcontinent and large swathes of Africa into the British Empire, which then facilitated the establishment of a substantial Indian Diaspora in Africa, which constitutes a radical difference between India and most other international actors involved in Africa. The prime dynamic for this was indentured labour.

Indenture was a form of debt bondage, by which 3.5 million Indians were transported to various colonies by the European imperialist to provide labour for the (mainly sugar) plantations. An individual was bound to work according to a prescribed contract (usually five years) and it amounted to a ‘transfer of labour power from metropoles to colonies’ and was ‘a system of bonded labour [with a] resemblance to slavery’ (Malherbe, 1991: 4). During the contracted period the labourer was paid a basic wage and provided with accommodation and rations. After five years, the labourer could either re-indenture or seek employment elsewhere in the colonial territory. After ten years (depending on the contract), the labourer could claim a free or subsidised return passage to India or accept a piece of land in lieu of the ticket. (Jain, 1993:6). Before indenturing himself the prospective labourer had to swear before a magistrate that he realized what contract entailed. However, numerous reports of how the contracts were explained to the labourers dishonestly, as well as reports of actual abduction by the recruiting agents, were recorded.

In the aftermath of Britain’s abolition of the slave trade (1807) and then slavery itself (1834), the colonial administration of India oversaw a system of labour migration. The colonial plantation owners required labour and brought pressure on the British authorities to introduce the system of indentured immigration, based at Calcutta and Madras. Following the abolition of slavery in French colonies in 1846 and Dutch colonies in 1873 respectively, French and Dutch agro-capitalists also concluded agreements with the Raj to acquire labourers under the same system. Though a large number went to the West Indies, the majority of Indians ended up in Africa:
## Indentured Indian Immigrants by Destination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1834–1912</td>
<td>453,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana</td>
<td>1838–1917</td>
<td>238,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>1860–1911</td>
<td>152,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>1845–1917</td>
<td>143,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunion</td>
<td>1829–1924</td>
<td>118,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1879–1916</td>
<td>60,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadeloupe</td>
<td>1854–85</td>
<td>42,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>1895–1901</td>
<td>39,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1854–85</td>
<td>36,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Guiana</td>
<td>1873–1916</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinique</td>
<td>1854–89</td>
<td>25,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1899–1916</td>
<td>6,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>1858–95</td>
<td>4,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>1856–85</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>1861–80</td>
<td>2,472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During this period, Indian people leaving their country under the indentured system were destitute. Many had been prohibited from access to land and some had found no alternatives in the developing colonial capitalist economy within India. Some among these migrants seem to have left India with an idea they would one day return having "made it" as part of some sort of project to uplift the family. Though more research needs to be done on this topic, it is quite feasible however that others left without the knowledge of their family with the intention never to return. It is known that some left against the wishes of their families who then warned them that they would not take them back. Of those who did return, some of them were thought unsuited for the old social conditions in India or themselves had lost feelings of close attachment to “home”. Many returnees felt strangers in India (Emmer 1986:196-98).

Other than the informal relationships which existed between emigrants and their families in India, the imperialist government had a strong stance on this sort of migration. In 1910, Lord Salisbury (report of the Committee on Emigration from India to the Crown Colonies and Protectorates 1910) wrote that:

> From an Indian point of view, it is desirable to afford an outlet from these redundant regions into the tropical and sub-tropical dominions of Her Majesty, where people who hardly earn a decent subsistence in their own country may obtain more lucrative employment and better lives.

Salisbury went on:

> From an imperial point of view it seems proper to encourage emigration from India to the colonies well fitted for Indian populations. It is better for India that they should return to this country with her savings and their place in the colony should be taken by others who are in need of employment. In many of the colonies to which emigration from India is practised under the Emigration Act the immigrants are well treated and

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amass considerable savings. This substantial benefit is reaped by individuals and we are anxious to encourage emigration to such colonies in every legitimate manner. But the numbers emigrating or that are likely to emigrate under any probable conditions are too small to afford any substantial relief to the congestion of population from which some parts of India suffer, while on the other hand, having regard solely to the interests of India, it is not advantageous that the coolies should settle down in the colonies, spend their savings there, and breed up a race of Indian labourers, who will in time supply the local demand for labour. It is better for India that they should return to this country with their savings and that their place in the colony should be taken by others who are in need of employment.

However, there were many within the colonial government who thought otherwise and did not want the migrants returning to India. This opinion asserted that those who returned were ‘unsettled by the easier life they lead in the colonies’ and such people were ‘generally unable to settle down again to the harder conditions of life prevailing in their native villages and to use their capital economically’. The supposed benefits of returnees spreading their largesse in India for the betterment of the country as discounted and instead it was objected that, ‘with the assistance of their relations and friends they dissipate their savings and then seek to return to the colonies’. Raj officials holding this view were keen that ‘these immigrants should settle in the colonies where they have served their term of probation’ and that ‘even in the event of abolition of the industry’ there ought not to be ‘any necessity for the repatriation of the large number of immigrants’ (ibid: 106).

Interestingly, as the national movement developed in India, the “overseas Indians” played an important role, struggling against the indentured labour system and then against discrimination of Indians in the colonies. Of course, Mahatma Gandhi’s role in South Africa is the best-known, but he was not the only individual involved in such protests.

Increasingly, indentured labour began to be seen as a significant issue in the fight against British imperialism. As late as 1893, Mahadev Govind Ranade, a leading nationalist at the time and a founding member of the Indian National Congress, still believed that ‘Indian foreign emigration’ afforded some ‘relief’ to the growing population of India, and that thus the expansion of the British Empire could be seen as a ‘direct gain’ to the Indian masses as territorial expansion of the Empire meant new opportunities for India’s poor. However, in 1896 Mohandas K. Gandhi met with Gopal Krishna Gokhale and tried to interest him in the cause of overseas Indians. Gandhi, who was living in South Africa and practicing law at the time, tried to convince other nationalists of the necessity to abolish indenture. The situation of the “coolies” was greatly dramatised during Gandhi’s Satyagraha campaign in South Africa, who denounced the complacent attitude of the colonial South African government to the dire condition of many Indians in Natal (Emmer, 1986: 200). Abolition of indentured labour was demanded, which finally took place in 1916, bringing an end to the exportation of Indian labour. A brief sketch of how the Indian Diaspora evolved in selected African countries is undertaken:
Mauritius

Mauritius, a French possession from 1715 onwards, was seized by the British in 1810 during the Napoleonic War. Previously uninhabited, in 1721 some Indians immigrated to Mauritius as slaves, merchants, skilled workmen and artisans. There they lived alongside slaves imported from Africa and Madagascar. When the British banned slavery, the first contingent of indentured laborers were sent from India, arriving in 1834. The indentured laborers worked on sugar cane plantations, and sugar industry and came primarily from Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, as well as the United Provinces. In fact, today Bhojpuri is one of the Indian languages that is still widely spoken in Mauritius.

During the period 1834-1907 over 450,000 indentured Indians arrived in Mauritius, whilst around 170,000 returned to India. By 1900 around one-third of the land under sugarcane was owned by Indians. By the 1920s, many of these people of Indian origin had become petit-bourgeois traders and demographically dominated the island. The Indo-Mauritians who are Hindus (60.33 percent) and Muslims (13.77 percent), constitute 74 percent of the total population. They basically control political life on the island.

South Africa

In Natal, British planters required labourers for the developing sugar industry. In 1859 the Natal government consented to overseas recruitment and the indenture system was extended to Natal. Between 1874-1892 the Natal government contributed £10,000 per year from public funds to support labour recruitment and between 1860 and 1911 some 140,000 Indians arrived. The majority of the laborers were Hindus from Madras Presidency and Travancore, whilst others came from Orissa and Bengal. The vast majority were extremely poor: among the 3,200 indentured laborers on eight boatloads selected at random during this period, 2 percent were Brahmins, 9 percent were Kshatriyas, 21 percent were Vaishyas, 31 percent were Sudras, 27 percent were Scheduled Castes, 3 percent were Christians and 4 percent were Muslims (Kuper, 1960: 7).

Indians worked on the plantations initially but later spread to the railways, dockyards, municipal service and coalmines in northern Natal. Initially, plantation workers were offered land as an inducement to re-indenture, but as the number of Indians increased (to the alarm of the white settlers) an earlier promise of citizenship was rescinded and the offer of land was withdrawn. However, the vast majority of Indians remained in Natal, becoming market gardeners and trading in peri-urban and urban areas (just under one quarter of Natal’s Indians returned to India) (Lemon, 1990: 131).

Of course, under apartheid Indians were discriminated against. The Group Areas Act, applied in 1950, forcibly moved Indians into so-called into Indian townships. Indian South Africans had their movements restricted and were not even allowed to reside in the Orange Free State, needing special permission just to enter the province! They were also, as a matter of state policy, given a sub-standard education compared to White South Africans. The South African Institute of Race Relations’ 1970 Survey of Race Relations cited an estimate that the ratio of per capita expenditure for White pupils as against Coloured was 1 to 3.2; for Indians, 1 to 3.2 and for Black pupils one to 15.8.
In 1961, Indians were officially recognised as a permanent part of the South African population, with the Department of Indian Affairs (with a white minister in charge) being established. In 1983, the Constitution was reformed to allow the Coloured and Indian minorities a limited participation in separate (and subordinate) Houses of a Tricameral Parliament. This had little support however. The Indian house was called the House of Delegates. Many Indians played an important role in the anti-apartheid struggle and as a result some occupied positions of power in post-apartheid South Africa (and still do). Today, over 80 percent of the South African Indian community lives in KwaZulu-Natal.

**Tanzania**

Indian traders had been visiting the East African coast for centuries and by the mid-nineteenth century, there were a number of Indian trading communities living in Zanzibar and other east African ports, primarily Muslim although Parsees were also present.\(^1\) According to Sir Bartle Frere who visited Zanzibar in 1873, ‘the preponderating influence of the Indian trader along some 6,000 miles of sea-coast in Africa and its islands, and nearly the same extent in Asia, the Indian trader is, if not the monopolist, the most influential, permanent, and all-pervading element of the commercial community’ (quoted in Jain, 1993: 132).

Widespread penetration of East Africa by Indian traders occurred as a consequence of colonial partition. However, the bulk arrived after the First World War when a large number of Hindus migrated from Gujarat and Punjab.

In 1964 Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to form what is now Tanzania. The new president, Julius Nyerere, nationalized all large-scale foreign firms, including all the banks, insurance companies, import-export agencies, flour mills etc., directly affecting the Indian business class. Large numbers of Indians emigrated to either Kenya or Britain such that by 2015 there were only 50,000 persons of Indian origin in Tanzania. They do however control a sizeable portion of the Tanzanian economy. The majority are in fact Muslim and so unlikely to be attracted to the BJP’s version of Bharat Mata.

**Uganda**

In 1894 Britain proclaimed a protectorate over Uganda but Indian penetration of the country was minimal with the exception of a small Sikh community who were brought in on three year contracts to build the Uganda Railway. Some Gujarati traders also arrived to serve the economic needs of the indentured labourers. However, in 1921 the population of Asians in Uganda was a mere 3,518, although they controlled the cotton industry. It was in fact between the two world wars that the Indian population of Uganda grew exponentially. This was not popular with the Africans and in 1945 there were anti-Indian riots across the country, repeated in 1949 (Tinker, 1977: 151-53.).

In 1962 Uganda became independent, with a population of Indians of about 78,000. This minority however Asians controlled 80 percent of commerce and 75 percent of industry and manufacturing. Virtually all the coffee, tea, tobacco, sugar and cotton estates were owned by Asians. In 1969 laws designed

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\(^1\) The most famous of course being Farrokh Bulsara a.k.a. Freddie Mercury of the rock band *Queen.*
to eliminate non-citizens from the economy were introduced, which threatened Indian interests, most of whom were reluctant to adopt Ugandan citizenship. In 1971, General Idi Amin seized power through a coup and a year later expelled all 90,000 Ugandan Asians (50,000 of whom were counted as Indians). The expelled even included Ugandan citizens of Indian descent. Only 1,000 remained behind in Uganda. Years later, in 1991, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni invited the Asians to return and invest in Uganda. Very few returned however and the Ugandan experience has made many people of Indian origin in Africa nervous, even today.

Kenya

In 1895 London assumed responsibility from the Imperial British East Africa Company. British settlement was actively encouraged whilst around 32,000 indentured Indians helped build the Kenya-Uganda Railway from Mombasa to Kisumu. Approximately 2,500 labourers died during construction (about four deaths for each mile of track laid). Many of the indentured workers subsequently migrated to different parts of East Africa, establishing themselves as petty traders and then as wholesale and retail traders and industrialists. The construction and transport industries in Kenya became under the control of Indian entrepreneurs, who also had strong interests in the cotton, sugar and sisal industries. The Indians came predominately from Gujarat and the Punjab.

The population of Indians in Kenya rose from 11,787 in 1911 to 43,623 in 1931 and to 97,687 in 1948 (Jha, 1993:133). By the 1950s, a number of Indians in Kenya felt frustrated by colonial rule and discrimination against them by the white settlers and threw their lot in with Kenyan nationalists. Famous Indians during this period included Pio Gama Pinto founder of the Kenya African National Union newspaper, Makhan Singh, the father of Kenyan trade unionism, and A.R. Kapila and Fitz de Souza who were lawyers and defend African nationalists in court.

The Kenya African Union secured independence for Kenya from Britain in 1963 under Jomo Kenyatta. The Indian population at the time of independence was 176,500 in Kenya (Gregory, 1963: 4). The history of Kenyan politics since Independence has been punctuated by vitriolic outbursts against Indians. Asians, along with Europeans, were given two years to acquire Kenyan citizenship and renounce their British passports. Out of approximately 180,000 Asians and 42,000 Europeans in Kenya at the time, fewer than 20,000 did so, leading to animosity from Africans. The subsequent 1967 Immigration Act stripped Indians of many of the leading positions in commerce, followed by the Trade Licensing Act of 1967 which reserved certain geographical areas (especially town centres) for commercial activity by citizens. Non-citizens were permitted to trade only if granted an annual license. The measure was specifically aimed at the concentrations of Asian business and trade in Nairobi and Mombasa. Violence in 1968 against Indians led to large-scale migration of Indians to the United Kingdom. According to the 2009 Census, there were 46,782 Kenyan Asians, whilst Indians without Kenyan citizenship numbered 35,009.
Zambia

Indians from Gujarat arrived in what was then the British territory of North-Eastern Rhodesia in 1905, coming from Southern Rhodesia. The vast majority were skilled artisans and petit-bourgeois, primarily Muslim. After Zambia achieved independence in 1964, the Kenneth Kaunda government took a strong non-aligned policy and looked towards India for support. This bolstered the role of the Indian community in the country, who hold a strong position in banking, retail and farming. Although numbering only 13,000, Zambia’s Indian population has been relatively influential, including cabinet ministers of Indian origin.

The Indians Abroad

As the Indian national movement gained substantial traction, overseas Indians were definitely seen as part of a future free Indian nation. Though there was little pressure on the migrants to return “home”, there were appeals to them to identify with the nationalist cause, which would in the long run also be of advantage to them as ‘only a free India [could] hope to protect and safeguard the interests of Indians abroad’ (Gangulee, 1947:14). The overseas Indians were asked ‘to identify with the exploited and not with the oppressors’ (Gangulee, 1947:10) and develop ‘a feeling of unity with the land of their adoption’ (Ibid: 11). For such Indian nationalists as Nagendranath Gangulee therefore, the Indian nation extended beyond territory and that India was presented not as a territorial but as a deterritorialised state. Many nationalists in India had embraced the Gandhian ideology in which overseas Indians had been made part of a (future) free nation. Spatial location did not matter much as there yet was no ‘free India’.

After 1947, Gandhi’s ideas with regard to the overseas Indians were essentially shelved and a policy of ‘studied indifference’ (Parekh 1993:38) was adopted. Jawaharlal Nehru led this shift because, unlike Gandhi, Nehru did not see overseas Indians as belonging to the Indian nation. As far as Nehru was concerned, ‘expatriate Indians had forfeited their Indian citizenship and identity by moving abroad and did not need the support of their mother country’. Only those residing within India’s new borders were “truly” Indian and overseas Indians were counselled to identify with where they lived and not with India. As a result, overseas Indians were not part of India’s diplomacy (Lall 2001:41). The official policy of Nehru (quoted in Lall 2001:169) was basically:

It is the consistent policy of the government that persons of Indian origin who have taken foreign nationality should identify themselves with and integrate in the mainstream of social and political life of the country of their domicile. The government naturally remains alive to their interests and general welfare and encourages cultural contacts with them. As far as Indian citizens residing abroad are concerned, they are the responsibility of the government of India.

Within this Nehruvian worldview, dual citizenship was impossible. Either they assumed citizenship of the other country, or they were to remain Indians minus the rights of citizenship. According to Nehru, people should identify with one place only, namely where they lived. The Citizenship Act that was passed in 1955 and removed the right, which had been provided in the constitution, of Indians overseas to citizenship. ‘Ultimately and predictably, a territorially based
‘nativist’ nationality emerged to preclude extra-territorial citizenship’ (Sutton, 2007: 286-287).

Consequently, “overseas Indians” were no longer an integral part of the wider Indian nation, although somewhat contradictorily, Nehru believed that ‘Wherever in this world there goes an Indian, there is also a bit of India with him’ (quoted in Gupta 1994:1). Yet Nehru then demanded of them that they ‘forget their separate identities’ (Ibid: 15). This had more to do with Nehru’s foreign policy of non-alignment and South-South solidarity. People of Indian descent, particularly in East Africa, were not particularly popular and were often accused of being aloof and even racist towards Africans. Nehru in fact at one point in asserted that ‘we have told the Indians there year after year...they must co-operate with the Africans...we will not support them in their demand for any privilege that goes against the Africans. If you can’t get on with the Africans, you’ll have to get out of Africa....that’s what we have told our Indian’ (quoted in Oonk, 2013: 211). The last thing Nehru wanted was the Indian Diaspora disrupting or undermining his status as a putative leader of the postcolonial world.

Notably, and in line with the wider question of identity and who exactly is Indian, in the immediate post-partition period there was also a strong attempt to delineate Indianness. Those abroad registering as citizens were to accept the ideas of the Indian Constitution and to work towards the objectives set forth in it specifically and singularly, secularism. In fact, when 200 application forms for citizenship registration were requested in Kenya by the Ismailia Council, the commission replied with a letter questioning the credibility of potential applicants ‘to become citizens of India, a State founded on the principle of secularism and non-communal ideologies’ (Rao, 1951).

Evolution to this stance occasionally cropped up. As early as 1973 the Indian government had inaugurated the category of non-resident Indian (NRI) for both economic and political reasons. When the Janata government took power in 1977, some change in policy towards the overseas Indians were introduced. New entry laws were brought in that allowed overseas Indians to return to India even if citizens of another country. Atal Bihari Vajpayee (then Minister for Foreign Affairs) asserted that India would ‘never disown overseas Indians, or fail to appreciate their loyalty to the motherland’ (ibid). New Delhi began sponsoring discussions on ‘overseas Indians’ and the Indian Council for Cultural Relations were mandated to engage with the Diaspora. A cell within the Ministry of External Affairs was reevaluated to serve the overseas Indians better. The Friends of India Society International argued for a separate government department for overseas Indian affairs.

A strongly nationalistic tinge was associated with these moves, with a concomitant rejection of Nehruvian ideas. The government in New Delhi sought to encourage the development of networks of support amongst the Diaspora. Nehru’s policy was felt to be ‘confused, erratic and apathetic’ (Bahadur Singh, 1979: 326). Notably though, when religious-cultural missions or language teachers were sent abroad they projected Bharat Hind and the language taught abroad (sponsored by New Delhi) was Hindi. Markedly, in 1979, I.J. Bahadur Singh argued that the ‘Indian Diaspora was part of India’ and thus could not be sidelined by New Delhi. Singh in fact proposed a utilitarian approach to the
Diaspora, suggesting that ‘It would only be natural for us to turn to the one resource on which we have a national claim. This resource is the large funds, which are at the command of people of Indian origin overseas. Sentimentally they also would like to give first preference to India’ (1979: 217). This claim of an emotional attachment to the “motherland” which would then result in financial largesse flowing back to India went untested and rested on some pretty big assumptions (see below).

However, there was a qualitative shift in attitude as neoliberal restructuring began sweeping across India. The old Nehruvian view on ‘Overseas Indians’ was replaced by the new discourse of ‘People of Indian Origin’ in 1998 (Brown, 2006). This change in itself was a return back to Gandhi’s viewpoint that had included the Indian Diaspora within the wider hypothesis of the Indian nation. Somewhat controversially, the new discourse asserted that ‘groups settled in a place are not necessarily of it’. This has a two-edged sword to it. Firstly, in this way certain groups (such as religious minorities), could henceforth be delineated as being somehow ‘outside the nation’. Conversely, the “right sort of Indian” abroad, though actually residing beyond India’s borders could be included.

The Commodification of the Diaspora

The new approach to India’s Diaspora has taken place within the wider context of the adoption, in 1991, of a neoliberal economic policy framework. ‘[T]his shift was a momentous development and a leading World Bank economist reportedly celebrated it as among the “three most important events of the twentieth century”, alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s transition to “market reforms” (Jha, 2005: 3677). For others, it is ‘probably the most significant [discontinuity] since the country’s independence from colonial rule in 1947’ (Mazumdar, 2014: 79). The immediate stimulus for this abrupt change was a balance of payments crisis instigated by the effects of the first Iraq war which hugely increased India’s oil import bill whilst exports slumped, credit dried up and capital flight from non-resident Indians’ deposits from Indian banks increased exponentially (Ghosh, 2006). This crisis was seized on by important elements in leading classes to push for a dismantling of the Nehruvian dirigiste state, enthusiastically supported by those within India with aspirations for accumulation under the new dispensation.

This moment had long been percolating, with reformers increasingly pushing for change (Desai, 2012). The crisis of 1991 opened the opportunity for this volte face. ‘Policy reform was favoured by state elites under the influence of new ideas, eliciting a change in the ideological orientation from those that shaped earlier policies. These elites included political leaders and bureaucrats…Together they formed an “epistemic community” with new goals, and sought the reconstruction or modification of previous policies’ (Shastri, 1997: 28). Now, ‘[Indians] are told by the ruling political establishment, and reported prominently in the media, that [the] growing international stature of India has been possible due to the process of globalisation. Despite its many shortcomings, we are told further, if less directly, that we need to play the game according to the global rules set by the United States’ (Bhaduri, 2010: 40).
Whilst it was the Congress Party and Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister who initiated the neoliberal reforms, when Congress lost power in 1996 and then in 1998, the new government led by the Hindu chauvinist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which solidified power in 1998, carried forward the reforms with enthusiasm, which has continued to this day under successive governments. ‘[I]t would be a fair assessment that the IMF-World Bank perspective has been very well entrenched in shaping the policies of the central as well as a number of state governments. For instance, in the case of central government, the key economic ministries have been headed, almost uninterruptedly since the early 1990s, by the same people although political parties heading the government have been tossed around quite a bit by the electorate, by some of the staunchest advocates of neoliberalism’ (Jha, 2005: 3677-3678). This has been supported by dominant fractions of the Indian bourgeoisie who have increasingly become outward-oriented—and supportive of the existing global order:

A large part of the Indian bourgeoisie is now prepared to settle for rentier status, and to collaborate with foreign capital. Politically, there is a growing sense among the Indian bourgeoisie that American political and strategic dominance can’t be challenged, and although they would like to see it tamed, it is out of their hands. So they are willing to settle for the best they can get, by trying to become more important regionally and internationally through greater collaboration with the US (Vanaik, 2004).

Since 2004, a Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition has been in power, with Manmohan Singh as prime minister. He has had to face domestic constituencies (particularly, but not exclusively, in the retail sector) threatened by liberalisation, who remain resistant to the reform process. As a result, ‘Singh’s United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government is trying to have it both ways; embracing globalisation and protecting domestic popular interests’ (Ollapally and Rajagopalan, 2012: 88). Under such impulses, Indian foreign policy is moving away from its non-aligned position to one of multi-alignment. India’s foreign policy debates are centred on three key positions. The first revolves around the hawks on Pakistan, which need not be discussed further. The second centres on those who argue that India’s future lies with a close alignment with the United States. This position is held at the highest level: ‘in 2003, then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee reportedly confessed that strategic partnership with the United States was essential to his twenty-year program to attain great-power status; “otherwise India’s ability to project power and influence abroad anywhere would be greatly compromised”‘ (Research Unit for Political Economy, 2005: 16). Often, such arguments are also hawkish vis-à-vis Beijing. The third position argues that India’s best option is to try and manage both China and the United States equitably, extracting maximum benefits from the relationships. This position, which might be cast as strategic ambivalence or strategic autonomy, is what seems to be ascendent in India’s membership of the BRICS and also in any debates regarding India’s Africa policies, where New Delhi is conscious that it is playing catch-up on the continent to most other actors, particularly China.
In this regard, India’s business community and its organic intellectuals are most influential in framing the terms of the debate. India’s efforts to develop ties with Africa may be seen within this context, as can the wider debate about the role PIOs may play in India’s economy.

Although New Delhi continues an interest in non-alignment and notions of South-South solidarity, the focus these days is very much on the importance of national interests, particularly economic in nature. This is linked to a wider move within India away from statist economic policies to those more in line with neoliberalism. ‘In the dominant discourse—both in India and internationally—the latter policy shift [towards neoliberalism] is credited with having put India on a fast growth path for the first time in its history’ (Desai, 2007: 785). A surging economy within India requires new markets and new sites for Indian investment opportunities.

‘Indian capitalism has always been characterised by the domination of the corporate sector by a relatively small number of business groups controlled by well-connected and powerful business families and individuals’ (Mazumdar, 2014: 97). A prime example is the Tata Group, operating across SSA in a diverse array of economic sectors (Vines and Sidiropoulos, 2007). The Tata Group (with others) has helped to diversify African exports to a degree (Broadman, 2007: 12). For example, Tata has opened an instant coffee processing plant in Uganda and a vehicle assembly plant in Zambia (Naidu, 2007: 5). Both add value to raw materials and are obviously in the right direction when African diversification and industrialisation remain of such importance. Yet at the same time, the Tata Group asserts that it has ‘aligned business opportunities with the objective of nation building’ (Tata Group, 2008). Although private, the wider picture of aiding India’s rise is seen as an intrinsic aspect of Tata’s operations. Such rhetoric, tinged with mercantilist nationalism, contrasts strongly with the individualistic nature of most Western corporations, yet is emblematic of the fact that the liberalisation programme in India has led to ‘an even closer relationship between the state and private capital’ (Mazumdar, 2014: 94). Indeed, ‘in a globalised context, private business enterprises have…become the standard bearers of “nationalism”, “national interest” and “national achievement” so that national success tends to be seen as something that coincides with their success’ (ibid.: 95). This is where the PIOs come in.

The BJP Approach

With the takeover by the BJP coalition in 1998 after two United Front coalitions, the narrative of the nation unquestionably changed, as well as the understood role of the Indian diaspora in building this new India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has had other plans for the diaspora than previous governments. In an outline of its Foreign Policy and Agenda for the Future (1995:6-7) it was stated:

A more meaningful support to Indians living abroad whenever their basic human rights are violated is experienced from the BJP by the people in India and outside, so that Uganda and Fiji experiences are not repeated. The BJP is fully alive to its responsibility. The people of Indian origin living abroad are an asset, which the BJP would try to utilise to the fullest extent to foster relations of friendship and
cooperation between the countries of their residence and India. The BJP will seriously examine the question of dual citizenship to NRIs. Previously, Atal Bihari Vajpayee when minister for external affairs in the Janata government from 1977 to 1979 had pushed for a different attitude towards the Diaspora. During a conference in 1977, Vajpayee critiqued Nehru’s policy and asserted that ‘every Indian community overseas, whether rich or poor, needs to maintain contacts with India’. A cultaralist approach (with referenced to their distinctive Indian personality’) was adopted and in the Chennai declaration of the BJP it was stated that ‘We believe that the vast community of NRIs and PIOs also constitute a part of the Great Indian Family. We should endeavor to continually strengthen their social, cultural, economic and emotional ties with their mother country’ (quoted in Lall, 2001:98). But equally, a pragmatic business-oriented motive was also averred, with him stating that Indians in the developed and some parts of the underdeveloped world have capital and know-how, which could help India’s economic development (Bahadur Singh, 1979).

Currently, the political elites in New Delhi have reclaimed the Diaspora and has fashioned the notion of a deterritorialised nation state based on “Indianness” which means that the Indian nation exists wherever the Diaspora does. India is not unique in this respect (Schiller et al., 1999: 78-79). Now, PIOs are referred to as the “natural reserve” where there is an urgent need to tap their potential for the nation. Indeed, underlying this new interest in (and recasting of) the diaspora is the desire to attract inward investment into India and to expand the country’s markets wherever PIOs are resident. Liberalisation has made the transfer of remittances easier and ‘India is opportunistically using directives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank on freer exchange regulations to encourage more Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and PIOs to remit and invest funds in order to raise the level of remittances and investments from outside its own borders’ (Singh, 2011: 32). Under the neo-liberal regime the commodification of people of Indian origin as a “resource” is quite explicit.

Who constitutes this Indian nation abroad is however problematic and who can claim to be sons or daughters of Bharat Mata is inherently political given the government’s cultural policies. Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, a founding figure of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and revered by his ideological heirs as “Guruji” declared that:

The non-Hindu peoples of Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but the glorification of the Hindu race and culture... [In] a word they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment - not even citizen’s rights (quoted in Bhatt, 2001: 130).

As is well known, in his book Jyotipunj, Narendra Modi wrote a hagiography of Golwalkar.

**How “Indian” are PIOs?**

Since the 1990s, India has sought to re-engage people who it views as “overseas Indians”. The policy has been aimed particularly at such people living in the
developed world, highlighting the business-oriented nature of this new interest. However, utilising this imagined community is not as clear-cut as first may be supposed. The actual identity of who belongs to Bharat Mata remains open to interrogation, particularly under the BJP. But what is quite clear is that the whole PIO enterprise is not targeted at the Indian Diaspora as a whole. This is despite the official policy that a person of Indian origin (PIO) is “a citizen of any country other than Bangladesh, Pakistan or Sri Lanka, if he at any time held Indian passport, or he either his parent or any of his grand-parents was a citizen of India, or the person is spouse of an Indian citizen” (Indian Investment Centre, www.iic.in, cited in Landy et al., 2004: 204).

However, it is not the lower-class migrant labourers in the Gulf region who are included in this nation and nor is it the generally poor (or at least less affluent) Indians in Guyana or South Africa. Even the older merchant communities that form the bulk of the Diaspora in East Africa are not much of interest. Rather, it is the new Hindu middle-class professional and entrepreneurial migrant especially in the United States that forms an important focus for Indian politics (van der Veer 2005: 285). Indeed, there is an unspoken hierarchy (dare I say it, caste?) which underpins this notional Indian nation outside India. One’s worth within this nation is dependent upon what an individual can do for the continuing neoliberal capitalist accumulation strategy of the government in New Delhi.

In the African context, this is perhaps just as well as the Indianness of the Diaspora in Africa cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, just because one’s great-great-grandfather may have come from country x does not mean that one is likely to hold any meaningful link to the “motherland” beyond some idealized notions and perhaps a proclivity for various cultural attributes (food, dance etc.). When we consider Indian South Africans for instance, well over 95 percent regard English as their first language and most speak no vernacular Indian languages at all (Vahed and Desai, 2010). Meanwhile, one quarter of Indian South Africans have converted to Christianity and caste is not that important for marriage, whilst cuisine, dress, and other markers of “Indianness” have mutated into something as quintessentially South African as “bunny chow.” Concrete Indian identity is somewhat vague. In a survey performed in South Africa, out of 213 Indian respondents, between 15 and 17 year old, 80% did not know from where their ancestors came in India. Out of the 198 students who disclosed their religion, 37% of the Muslims knew their Indian place of origin, while only 19% of the Hindus and 4% of the Christians were aware of their geographical roots (Mainet-Valleix, 2002).

Particularly after the 1994 non-racial elections and the promotion of the idea of the “Rainbow Nation”, some South Africans of Indian descent even reject this vague notion of Indianness:

We are not Indian. Our race may be stated as ‘Indian’ on official documents, but we are South African. Most of our families have been in this country for up to seven generations. Most of us have not even been

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2 A hollowed out loaf of bread filled with curry, originating from Durban.
to India. The term ‘Indian’ is for (ugh) classification purposes. I personally do not like being referred to as another nationality entirely just because of my heritage. I am as South African as wors (Ramkissoon, 2012).

The grand-daughter of Mahatma Gandhi, born and brought up in South Africa has this to say about her Indian identity: ‘I am a South African. A very proud South African... The Indianness comes in at the level of... culture..., the kinds of things we appreciate like music, drama...What I am basically saying [is] that is where the Indianness stops (Quoted in Dupelia-Mesthrie, 2000: 9).

Due to their heterogeneity and generational remoteness from India, South African Indians generally recognize that there is no identity between India as a country and any form that constitutes an Indian. In other words, and contra to the BJP position on the Indian nation, for Indian South African ‘there is no unitary culture in India which can be termed Indian culture’ (Jayaram, 1998: 56). Hence it is very difficult for Indian South Africans to consider themselves as ‘Indians’ since the referent object is unclear and disputed. At the same time, however, “Indianness” becomes very flexible and fragmented. It is not the case that Indian South Africans totally disregard their Indian roots. India is still a key referent, but this is all very transcendental, possessing an abstract existence (Landy et al., 2004). At best we can say that a socially shared cultural Indianness ‘is a product of the past rather than a desire to come closer to the real India’ (ibid.: 214). This is not something that the idea of the PIO as a resource can really tap into.

Equally, in the case of Mauritius (the most “Indian” place in Africa), it cannot be assumed that the Diaspora will blithely perform for the benefit of the motherland. Currently, Mauritius is India’s single largest offshore investor: between 2000-2009, $49 billion of foreign direct investment came from Mauritius to India, making up 42 per cent of India’s total FDI during this period (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2007). This special role of Mauritius is however of interest:

Mauritius is widely regarded as an offshore financial centre (OFC) that is used by most foreign investors as an intermediary to reach India, predominantly to capitalise on the tax rebates that the country offers so as to minimise their overall tax burden. Conversely, as Indian companies have become more globalised, many have chosen either to use their overseas locally incorporated subsidiaries to invest outside their home countries, or to establish holding companies and/or special purpose vehicles in OFCs, or other regional financial centres, such as Singapore or the Netherlands, to raise funds and invest in third countries. Apart from this so-called transshipping, a portion of these inflows, from Mauritius in particular and also other OFCs, could also be round-tripping back to India to escape capital gains or other taxes, or for other reasons, not unlike the investments dynamics between China and Hong Kong (Hattari and Rajan, 2010: 502).

In fact, the Indian Finance Ministry has estimated that fake FDI from Mauritius costs India $600 million annually (Mail and Guardian, March 15, 2013).
Conclusion

There is at present a great interest within India in what are termed People of Indian Origin (PIOs) in Africa. Around 10 per cent of the global Indian Diaspora is located in Africa (Dubey, 2010) and these are relatively assimilated. According to one study, ‘in a 2006 survey of 450 business owners in Africa, almost half the respondents who were ethnically Indian had taken on African nationalities (with most of the other half retaining their Indian nationality), compared with only four per cent of firm owners who were ethnically Chinese (the other 96% had retained their Chinese nationality)’ (Broadman, 2008: 99). PIOs are currently seen by New Delhi as having the potential ability to facilitate cooperation and communication between Africa and India, as well as serve as economic agents for Indian commercial interests. This last point needs to be carefully managed by New Delhi as historic resentment against economically powerful ethnic Indians has long been a feature of a number of African countries—and is something which will not be helped by any notion that such actors are somehow advancing India’s agenda in any form. After all, Paul Theroux (1967) started his famous article on the Indian question in Kenya with the statement that ‘In East Africa nearly everyone hates the Asian’. The Asians by and large constituted a class in colonial and post-colonial Tanzania - the “commercial bourgeoisie”, understandably at odds with emergent African class formations. For Mahmoud Mamdani too, writing of Uganda, the Asians were an intermediary class, the ‘petty bourgeoisie’, playing the vital role of linking the African producer with metropolitan (British) capital. Not only this, but: “The petty bourgeoisie in the colony had, for political reasons, to be an ethnically alien petty bourgeoisie”, because such a category could ‘easily be segregated from the mass of the colonised and thus rendered politically safe’ (1976: 71).

India’s attempts to create links with its Diaspora have undergone various stages and have been directly influenced by India’s changing domestic political landscape. In the early postcolonial period, Jawaharlal Nehru was pre-occupied with domestic growth and South-South solidarity. For these reasons, Nehru distanced New Delhi from the Indian Diaspora. This was particularly the case in East Africa where the concerns of Indian traders clashed with African nationalism. It was this nationalism and the move towards independence that Nehru was concerned about. In turn, ambivalence and even antipathy towards India by East African Indians was common. Many felt abandoned by the motherland in the face of prejudice within Africa. It is notable that when Indians in Africa experienced difficulties (including actual, expulsion in the case of Uganda), they went anywhere but India (only 4,500 opted to go to India from Uganda).

Liberalization in 1991 changed the attitude towards Indians abroad in New Delhi. This combined with the emergence of Hindu nationalism. From the 1970s onwards, Hindu rightists had fundraised within overseas Indian communities and had expressed a more inclusive (whilst actually being exclusive) attitude towards Indians abroad compared to Nehru. The electoral victory of the BJP enabled this to be institutionalized and the BJP government then offered a Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) card, which furnished holders with multi-entry visas and certain commercial rights in India.
Of late, the Indian government is noticeably engaging the Indian Diaspora in Africa. Indian corporations and officials are increasingly enthusiastic by the economic and political potential of relations with the South and the Diaspora is now seen as a major resource that should be tapped into. Indians abroad in places such as Kenya and South Africa are being cast as possible lubricators of relations. However, challenges remain. The aloofness between East Africa’s Indians and India remains. Even if East African Indians today no longer feel abandoned by India, as many of their parents did in the 1960s-1970s, the relative lack of contact with India from the 1960s dictated onwards that their gaze is much more towards London or Toronto than it is to New Delhi or Mumbai. Few East African Indians thus far have demonstrated much interest in the resurgent India. South Africa is somewhat different, with a number of Indian-origin businesspersons attracted to India’s economic opportunities. This has much to do with Pretoria’s enthusiastic promotion of both IBSA (see Taylor, 2009) and BRICS and the subsequent publicity that this garners. But just as in Kenya, the paramount identity of South African Indians is their South Africanness. An Indian Diasporic cultural diplomacy that is built on Hindutva (even if only in the background) is unlikely to resonate very far.

In short, while India’s dynamic Diasporic transitions do provide exciting potential for India and overseas Indians, we should not intuitively assume that Diasporic-cultural linkages in Africa automatically provide India with advantages in its overseas activities. The post-colonial history of India-Diaspora relations, as well as the controversial place of overseas Indian communities within certain African societies, have produced complex situations that need to be negotiated collectively by India, overseas Indians and the host nations with which India hopes to engage through its “children” overseas. The “other India” as postulated by Bahadur Singh cannot be assumed.

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DISCUSSION REPORT AT IIC

The observations/ comments/ issues and questions shared during the lecture:-

The microscopic insight on Indian and Chinese Diaspora by Professor S. N. Malakar focused on the three waves of migration including labour, traders and technicians like doctors and academicians as they have their different characteristics intact with them. According to him, they have developed their characteristics in relation with the interaction within themselves as it has a meaning with the formulation of foreign policy. All the waves of migration has some roles to play and their characteristics of assimilation and integration with the local people which depends on the labour, how much these forces are working with the production process of the country which is different from each other. Because of different political backgrounds, India and China have different policy perspective like Chinese policy, according to professor is people centric and Indian Diaspora policy is corporate centric that is why differences between India and China exist on question of civil society it has a class character. In a certain kind of political system the nature of civil society would be quite different. Chinese civil society is very much different from Indian civil society. The changing nature of Diaspora has been tremendous from the past till the present as there has been a consistent change in foreign policies.

As observed by Professor Aparajita Biswas Diaspora factor has occupied very important component in India’s foreign policy in recent time and Chinese Diaspora is a new phenomenon. It has been manifested in Prime Minister’s speech at different places and has created a lot of enthusiasm in Indians’ comeback and investment in India. A different dynamic of Indian foreign policies have changed over time and is completely different. Indian Diaspora occupies a significant position in Africa like in Kenya and Tanzania etc. India has lots of goodwill and charity in Africa. It has established many schools, colleges, hospitals and industries. With regard to Chinese Diaspora it is comparatively a new phenomenon if we see from Indian perspective. Chinese businesses are being flourished in Africa and are very hard working.

Professor K. Mathews said that in terms of evolution of India- Africa policies starting from Gandhi, Nehru has been a tremendous one. Changes in the Indian foreign policy in the recent time have seen a new attachment with the west i.e. a policy of moving towards the west. It is important in the long term point of view that Africa and the Southern parts whether through IBSA or BRICS, India would have to think more towards its policies. India should not be in line with the imperialist model only and should go much more beyond especially in terms of civil society dialogue and other fields.

According to Professor Ajay Dubey, it was a coherent, empirical and detailed presentation on Indian Diaspora which was divided under: first on the characterization of Indian Diaspora its evolution and evolution of relationship between India and its Diaspora in the past and before independence while the second part focused on the current phase. The entire presentation made it feel that the dialogue was important in terms to understand Indian’s position and Indian views on issues that are important for the current engagement of India. The view
of British scholar having constituted about Indians in Africa and India and Africa re echoes all over and it is important to look over that how world look at us. The formulation of Diaspora and the countries of origin and host countries relationship and role of Diaspora in that. Indian Diaspora is unlike British Diaspora. The conceptualization of India’s Diaspora policies is very short. If the speech of all heads of state who have come to India is considered, one recurring reference is that use the Diaspora in their countries to promote bilateral relations. There is an image contribution of Indians in Kenya’s freedom struggle and unparallel contribution in apartheid. 12% of Indian origin ministers were in Mandela Government. There is a much broader narrative and factual statement is required to depict Indian Diaspora and to understand what India and its Diaspora can do together and how Indian Diaspora policy differ from western countries.

When the discussion was open to the floor, one of the audiences remarked that the lecture provided a good opportunity because of its historical depth to look at one Diaspora in comparison which does not actually exist anymore, which has dissolved like German Diaspora in the US, these are particular dominant societies and other large communities like Germans in 1990’s who moved to US and qualified to the criteria for the Diaspora. Interestingly it’s now very much different. The loyalty of German immigrant in the US actually never seems to be serious. There may have large scale immigrant communities which are relatively successful and different from the Indian communities in the US and would be extremely reluctant to much solidarity and conflict.

The idea of Indian nation itself was a question for a very long time because of its diverse setup in the same way Diaspora has itself duo existence and when we perceive them it should be taken into account. There has been so much change in the Indian Diaspora and also how much it has changed the Indian society. Actually culture is not a static entity in itself, it changes as it is a dynamic process and that happens all over the world.

On the question of Indian Diaspora competing with Chinese Diaspora in Africa Professor Taylor replied that competition between Indian and Chinese Diaspora is about profit and making money. The prime explanation was centered on market access and market capture by the Indians. Indian’s role in Africa has been tremendous like in apartheid and freedom struggle in Kenya.
DISCUSSION REPORT AT MUMBAI UNIVERSITY

The observations/ comments/ issues and questions shared during the lecture:-

To the question related to Chinese migration and its influence on the African government and its influence on the government policies of India Prof. Ian Taylor responded by saying that one thing we have to be honest about is the that Chinese have a head start in terms of their level of engagements they have in Africa in comparison to India like in terms of trade and cooperation etc. Indians are trying to catch up with it, like the third Indo-African Forum summit is to take place in New Delhi with 54 heads of State representing Africa for the first time which is a replication of the Chinese model. The migrants of china have been more under the problems than India. The Chinese are involved in many controversies where they are seen as undermining state. For e.g. Ghana government expelled thousands of Chinese for mining gold illegally there. A case in Angola where bunch of Chinese were expelled and deported because they were accused of being involved in Chinese organized crime and same situation was seen in South Africa and also in Nigeria as Zambia as well. There have been cases where Chinese have been accused for under paying their workers, it was a worst case where violent clashes between Chinese employees and African workers were noticed which led to the death of some Africans. There were anti Chinese riots in Zambia. The role and behavior of Chinese migrants have been complication factor in Chinese foreign policy. Chinese embassy has a very little control over all these activities. In Libya when Gaddafi regime was collapsing there was a need to evacuate Chinese citizens. Chinese government estimated that about 18,000 Chinese citizens needed to be evacuated but in reality it was more than 35,000 citizens. More engagement gives rise to more of political problem and managing on such relations becomes difficult unlike Indians which are being managed for much longer time, which add an advantage for India.

On the issue of accepting a local citizenship in Africa he explained that Indians have been staying in Africa for much longer and their Diaspora has been much more wider like in Kenya and Tanzania and therefore, they inherit the citizenship whereas Chinese has been there from last 10-15 years, which becomes the basic difference between the two. May be in the future, Chinese community does settle down and stay with their families and then may become citizens as in South Africa and Mauritius but at this point of time we could say it’s a generational kind of thing.

The next question was related to Indian Diaspora and its multiple identities and multi facet organizational structure. Indian and Chinese Diaspora to some extent is concerned with two very related concern of dependency discourse and discourse of co-option and how these work for Diaspora and Civil society concern in both India as well as China. On this Prof. Taylor replied that he sees a plane out in Indian Diaspora in various ways. A good example would be in terms of regional identities and also political identities like RSS and BJP are very much active among certain element in Indian Diaspora. Religious organizations have
different levels. Indian Diaspora is much more segmented or divided along various lines of political cultural and religious line perhaps Chinese where there is no democracy so no political party engagement is seen there. Chinese have much more unitary idea of their staying constituted and have less debate about policy. This complicates the Indian Diaspora in a big way, not necessarily in a negative way. Further on the issue of dependency and co-option he elaborated that we have to look in the way western donors have co opted African actors and have established dependency relationship either for financial or intellectual dependency. Both the countries should be careful against such dependencies.

One of the observations by an audience was about the explanation of old Diaspora i.e. a change in perception on the part of Indian Diaspora itself as well as policies of host and home countries. For e.g. India has changed its policy from disassociation to active association with Diaspora and South Africa foreign policy where they were earlier reluctant to use Diaspora in bilateral relation with India and now they are very much interested in. His question was related to unofficial policy about dumping its workers especially who are working at lower level in Africa in order to create China town all over Africa. On this issue Prof. Taylor focused on the fact that there have allegation in several reports which is not actually true as Chinese are not particularly dumping workers in Africa. The vast majority of Chinese have gone to Africa, independently of the state and because they think they can make money. The Chinese are there in Africa for their private reasons and profits. If it was a policy of Chinese government to dump workers, they would have dumped them to Russia, Siberia and any other neighboring countries and not particularly in Africa. And with regard to the shift in policy of Diaspora he replied that more focus of Indian Diaspora is on the change in policy but they have been much more pro active in engagement in Diaspora since the adoption of neo liberal policies and economic policies where the Indian Diaspora is seen as a resource which could be tapped into. As India has become one of the emerging powers and now been attractive for Indians and other Diaspora associated with it. In the past being associated with India was not seen as interestingly as now seen as super power on the rise. This is a kind of shift in attitude of Diaspora over the years.

On Prof. Taylor’s remark on China’s head start a question was raised that is it too late as in old scramble for Africa and if we invest money in Africa would lose like Italy or there is something to gain. He replied wisely on this issue that at one level they have got a huge advantage over India on the other level India has a preferred advantage because it can avoid making the same mistake that Chinese did. The biggest interests of Chinese were to secure energy sector and for that it signed a lots of contract with African government. Energy prices were too high at that time therefore China also lost lots of money where it made some money out of it. The other thing of the head start is India has been much slower but in many respect Indian companies have been wiser because they have been more cautious and less intimate to take risk. This is because most Indian actors are private and have to make money whereas Chinese companies stay tuned to have cheaper Chinese capital so that they can afford to take risk, but that is not necessarily a good business model in the long run. Though China has a head start but this gives India opportunity to avoid mistakes that Chinese have made.
Another issue regarding the civil society being at early stage was raised that is there any chance of contradiction in the action of India and China in Africa where government is supposed to play a greater role in real development of Africa. On this he replied as civil society organizations promoted real development. The nature of governance in Africa is such that African government are themselves interested in promoting development. In many countries of Africa the state and elites really want to see the real development and continuation of capital flows, strength and relationship, which support their regimes but real development means where people are educated, there is gender equality, function in civil societies. These are not necessary things that elite wants because they pose challenges to their regime. Civil society organizations working in Africa can face such challenges, which can feel not supportive of the African government. They can be involved in local politics and can have problems.

On the issue of conflict and tension between Indian and Africans, Prof. Taylor remarked that it is because petty traders and bourgeoisies always wanted to be seen as interface in indigenous communities. If we see the history of minorities, it is not particular to Indians, as these are very easy targets for resentment and dislike. When the huge economies go down the minorities are hated. African politicians have used Indian god to their advantage. Any government can mobilize political support to a particular segment of people.

In response to the sense of hubris in Indian and Chinese civil society organization towards African people he said that yes, there is a kind of hubris in a sense that they are emerging powers but there is also a criticism both India and China being hubris.

As China and India both are moving towards Africa. So is there adequate space for both them to grow their economies and capture the market? On this issue Prof. Ian Taylor explains the current situation in Africa where both India and China are involved in this big continent and growing their economies. It depends from country to country but basically there is huge economic growth in last ten years. And there would be room for competition as to who provide the best services and who provides the most appropriate services.

On the issue of possibility of developing tripartite agreement between India, China and Africa on civil society and Diaspora, he replied in his own views that there is no much room for that. European Union tried doing that 10-15 years back but there were basic concerns on China’s involvement in Africa and tried to establish tripartite relationship between China, EU and Africa. The Chinese saw this as an attempt to see what all Chinese are doing in Africa, which was very patronizing and imperialistic attitude. If India and China try to get into such tripartite policies of agreement then their interest should have to be very sensitive on this kind of force that they try to divide Africa among themselves. So at this point of time its best to keep bilateral relations. And also Indian and Chinese, both have different interest in different fields like political, economical and commercial interest, therefore, the collaboration between these two and their interest in Africa would be different.

On the question of South Africa being special to Mahatma Gandhi as well as his granddaughter professor remarked that Gandhi Ji was involved in
political struggle and identified with that place and that country. South Africa is a place where larger numbers of Indians are there and have made huge contribution to the country unlike the other parts of Africa. Therefore Mahatma Gandhi and his granddaughter claim to be South African first and then Indians.

Lastly on the issue of energy sector Prof. Taylor said that there is a possible world for Diaspora. Many of the construction and infrastructure companies in East Africa are owned by Indians. There are Indians who consider themselves a Kenyan and Tanzanian first then Indians. But there are professional organization and well of capacities. It would not be surprising if the tenders of ONGC are put out in Africa and more of energy projects are involved. There would be more cooperation on these lines in coming future. Thus the Diasporic linkages of two countries would boost the economic interest in terms of energy sector.
HEINRICH BOLL FOUNDATION

The Heinrich Böll Stiftung / Foundation (HBF) is the Green Political foundation from Germany, affiliated to the "Greens/Alliance '90" political party represented the Germany's federal parliament. Headquartered in Berlin and with 30 international offices today, HBF conducts and supports civic educational activities and projects worldwide.

HBF understands itself as a green think-tank and international policy network, working with governmental and non-governmental actors and focusing on gender equity, sustainable development, and democracy and human rights.

With a presence in New Delhi since 2002, the HBF India office coordinates the interaction with stakeholders and partners in the country. Its programme focus areas include climate and resource policy, socio-economic policy from a gender perspective, the dynamics of democracy, and India's role in the new global order.