The Rolling Stones story on US General Stanley A McChrystal’s comments on President Barrack Obama and his team has brought to the fore not just the uneasy civil-military relations in the United States, but also a major divide in the Obama national security team on the war in Afghanistan. McChrystal’s counter insurgency (COIN) strategy of ‘clear, hold, build and transfer’ hinged on more ‘boots on the ground’ to reduce use of aerial power and consequent civilian casualties, provide protection to the populace and build on the host nation’s trust and capacity, was opposed by the rest of Obama’s Af-Pak team.
The dismissal of the top US military commander in a war situation did provide Obama an opportunity to shed the tag of being a weak and indecisive President. At a time when support for the war is dwindling among the American public and NATO countries, by appointing General David A Petraeus, a key architect of the Iraq surge strategy, Obama has laid to rest doubts on the continuity of the present US strategy in Afghanistan. By firing General McChrystal, Obama reasserted civilian control over the military and also sent a clear message that the White House would not tolerate division in the ranks of his team after a ‘strategy’ for Afghanistan had been laid out.
If disrespect for the supreme commander of the armed forces is a reason for a senior commander’s dismissal, there was a precedent for Obama to fall back on. Almost 60 years back, on April 11, 1951 President Harry S Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur in the midst of the Korean War for making public statements that contradicted the official policies of the US government. Even McChrystal’s predecessor, General David D McKiernan, was fired by Defence Secretary Robert Gates in May 2009. Incidentally, Gates had then backed the candidature of General McChrystal, saying, “We have a new strategy, a new mission and a new ambassador. I believe that new military leadership is also needed.”
Interestingly, after only about a year the new military leadership was found to be wanting in its relationship with its civilian counterpart. The US military effort in Afghanistan, which has now crossed the Vietnam War in terms of sheer duration, is increasingly proving to be a quagmire for the Obama administration. US military casualty figures in Afghanistan have soared in recent times. The proposed date for drawdown of forces in July 2011, in spite of a surge in troop levels, looks improbable, casting a long shadow on the promises made by the President.
Obama is reported to have privately reprimanded his national security team and emphasised ‘unity of effort’. However, if McChrystal’s dismissal is intended to remove divisions among the strategy team that has the potential of affecting the military performance in Afghanistan, Obama is sure to find soon that the firing of the General only partly addresses the problem. There are still men in his team who differ significantly on the strategy being adopted in Afghanistan. Even without General McChrystal, the differences are bound to flare up again in December, when the strategy is up for another major review.
There is an interesting parallel between McChrystal and McKiernan. Both wanted a heavier footprint. Both continuously asked for more troops. While Obama has fulfilled the request for more troops, it still remains about 30,000 less than what was demanded by McChrystal. However, Eikenberry, a retired Army lieutenant-general, who was once the top American commander in Afghanistan and currently is the US Ambassador to that country, repeatedly cautioned that deploying sizable American reinforcements would result in “astronomical costs” and would only deepen the dependence of the Afghan government on the US. Not long ago, Eikenbery wrote, “Sending additional forces will delay the day when Afghans will take over, and make it difficult, if not impossible, to bring our people home on a reasonable timetable.”
Eikenberry also sent the infamous cable disparaging Karzai as “not an adequate strategic partner” who “continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden.” The personal differences between President Karzai and Ambassador Eikenberry reached such levels that they were almost not on talking terms. Likewise, strong civil-military differences emerged when Ambassador Eikenberry opposed McChrystal’s request for a troop surge. Vice President Joe Biden, another key member of Obama’s team, supported a limited counter terrorism operation vis-à-vis a long-drawn-out counter insurgency campaign.
In contrast, General McChrystal shared a close relationship with Afghan president Hamid Karzai, who even made a personal appeal to retain McChrystal. Building on the host nation’s trust and capacity is a key essential of any counter insurgency strategy. Ahead of the proposed Kandahar offensive, Karzai travelled with McChrystal to apprise the Afghan leaders of the Kandahar campaign and involve them in it. McChrystal’s clear rules of engagement hinged on reducing civilian casualties, a thorny issue that has been highlighted by President Karzai.
As General Petraeus takes charge, the task will by no means be less daunting. Afghanistan today presents a much more complicated case than Iraq, a country which Petraeus is credited with calming down. Mid-course changes in the war lead to loss of institutional knowledge and personal connections. General Petraeus, though a mentor of McChrystal, will take time to build on his personal networks, understand the rural nature of the Afghan insurgency, deal with an active sanctuary and, more importantly, work to a narrow time frame. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan poses significant challenges, so that redefining the rules of engagement alone would be the magic bullet.
General Petraeus has the arduous task of breaking the Taliban’s momentum. Seven months into the surge of forces, the facts on the ground speak a different tale. If the ongoing operations in Marjah are any indication, the international forces will have to do much more than ‘hold the area’ and expect the Afghan government to bring in a semblance of governance. Most crucially, the bulk of these milestones will have to be achieved before July 2011, allowing Obama to keep his date with the most famous promise of 2009, the beginning of a drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan.
The author is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. shanthied@gmail.com
This article previously appeared in Business Standard, 4 July 2010. The opinion expressed in the article reflects the views of the author and not necessarily that of the foundation.