29th May 2009
THE Maoist attack that killed 16 policemen in Maharashtra on 21 May raises the number of such clashes in the midst of the general election to close to a dozen. The extremists have attempted to disrupt elections in certain states. However, a Maoist leader’s statement, as published in the Times of India (27 April, 2009), points to a link between what is deemed as revolutionary politics with mainstream politics. The suspicion that the Trinamul Congress could have supplied arms to the Maoists in their ‘struggle’ against the West Bengal government’s proposed Special Economic Zone in Nandigram opens up a Pandora’s box.
The need to establish local connections, the compulsions of the politics of survival, the increasing electoral uncertainties are among the factors behind the unstated inter-dependence between formal constitutional politics and the revolutionary politics of the Maoist variety. The extremists might describe this as a ‘strategic’ compulsion of their revolutionary tactics, but such a relationship can result in distortions – constitutional, democratic and administrative. Small wonder why the country’s political and security establishments are finding it increasingly difficult to confront the Maoists.
Contested Lok Sabha poll
Ever since its emergence, the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist brand of revolutionary politics has retained what can be described as a “sibling relationship” with India’s mainstream politics. India’s Communist movement has at once participated in parliamentary politics and experimented with revolution since the founding of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in the 1920s. Its first experiment with revolutionary politics was in Telangana in the 1940s. This was followed soon after by participation in the first general election.
Fielding 49 candidates for the Lok Sabha, it won 16 seats and 3.29 per cent of the votes. Its position improved in subsequent elections – in 1957 – 110 candidates, 27 seats and 8.92 per cent of the votes; in 1962 – 137 candidates, 29 seats and 9.94 per cent of the votes; in 1967 (i.e. after the first split), the two parties CPI (109 and 23) and CPI-M (59 and 19) contested 168 seats and won 42 with nearly 10 per cent of the votes. In 1971, the two parties had fielded 87 and 85 candidates and won 23 and 25 Lok Sabha seats, respectively. Their total voting percentage was around 10 per cent. This does not include their gains in Kerala and West Bengal.
The Naxalbari movement and the 1969 split within the CPI-M over the extremist ideology exposed the paradoxes and dilemmas the Communists have faced. Having prepared the background for the ‘revolution’, the CPI-M found itself torn between the movement and the new-found political power through the ballot in 1967. No wonder the revolutionaries parted ways in just two years. Thus was born the CPI (ML). Some of the Maoists subsequently contested the assembly elections in Bihar and West Bengal. Obviously, the lure of parliamentary politics did not cease at any stage. Even after the 2001 merger and the emergence of three consolidated Maoist groups, only one remains totally devoted to revolutionary methods and violence. It is significant that the other two do not want to give up the electoral option.
Clearly, the Communist movement in India has attempted to draw the political mileage from participating in parliamentary politics while keeping its lure of ‘revolution’ alive. They somehow accept the resilience of India’s constitutionally ordained political process. Also, while the ultimate goal of ‘revolution’ continues to be part of their ideology, they have not been able to give up the gains of accessing people through formal channels of politics.
However, their emerging overground to participate in electoral politics is at best an acceptance of parliamentary politics. It is the covert linkage with politicians and parties that intensifies the mess. Describing the Naxalites as ‘true patriots, who had been misunderstood by the ruling classes’, NT Rama Rao reportedly sought and secured the support of the People’s War Group in the 1983 Assembly election. The extremists exploited this overture to expand their base in eight out of ten districts in the Telangana region. The Congress leader, M Channa Reddy, adopted a similar strategy to win the 1988 assembly elections.
Fringe groups
THERE has been a consolidation of the Maoist groups since 2000. But the small fringe groups called dalams still exist in certain parts of the compact revolutionary zones. Detailed information about them is not available in the public domain. While the existence of three groups, of which two are not totally averse to electoral politics, confirms the trend of the Communist movement, the fringe groups remain open to trade-offs with established leaders and parties for existential reasons.
The Maoists have attempted to disrupt the recent general election in their strongholds, but this does not necessarily indicate their complete isolation from and opposition to electoral politics.
The scenario gives rise to several questions regarding the nature of the Maoist movement in India today and the State’s capacity to tackle the phenomenon. For, even a tenuous deal between the two forms of politics dilutes their purpose and objective for which they work. The contradiction between the two forms of politics, which makes the State an enemy of the ‘revolutionaries’ and the ‘revolutionaries’ a security threat to the State, gets complicated rather than resolved because of the underhand deals. The rank and file of the Maoists follows the dictates of their party or leader and not of the State, leaving the people unprotected. The formal organs of the State get weakened under unwritten instructions to ignore Maoist activity to the extent possible.
The Author by: Prof. Ajay K Mehra, writer is Director, Centre for Public Affairs, Noida
This article previously appeared in The Statesmen and has been uploaded on this website with the express permission of the author.