Lessons and Actions for the Government of India to deal with problem of Naxalism

Dr. K.S. Subramanian
IPS (Retd), Former DGP
Email: mani20026@gmail.com

1. How do you assess the present mass killing of security personnel by the Maoists in Dantewara, Chattisgarh? What is the reason for this massacre?
   
   The recent mass killing of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) men by the Maoists in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, was an avoidable tragedy. Under the Constitution of India, ‘public order’ and ‘the police’ are state subjects. Law and order management in states such as Chhattisgarh is the responsibility of the state governments concerned. The central police forces, such as the CRPF, are only meant to assist the state police forces and not to take the lead, when deployed in the states. In this case, however, the central forces, unfamiliar with the local terrain, were apparently left to fend for themselves without any meaningful support from the state police forces. The immediate question which arises: Why was only one state police head constable killed in the incident while so many central policemen were butchered? It appears that the state police forces allowed or asked the central police forces to patrol the interior forest areas on their own without any support from them for fear of losing their own men. This is very disturbing as this might lead to conflict between central and state police forces in such situations in future. Similar incidents have also occurred in the northeast, where I have served. In one of the incidents, 27 CRPF men were misled by false intelligence about the whereabouts of extremists and were lured into the interior only to be ambushed and killed. The CRPF, always under pressure, are often deployed from state to state frequently on account of security requirements. They are unfamiliar with the local terrain and not always prepared for local logistical challenges. They tend to get confused and make wrong moves leading to disaster. It is necessary to take steps to prevent state police forces from behaving in the manner they have done in the present case. 
   
   The Maoists are well prepared having lived there, and know the terrain and its logistical problems better than security forces deployed. The Government of India should learn the right lesson and refrain from indiscriminate deployment of central forces from one state to another frequently without adequate preparation and training. Major calamities such as the present, would in future deter central policemen from going into interior areas and even promote hostility between central and state police forces, which would be dangerous for the Indian State. 
   
   Further, the central government strategy of the Petraeus Doctrine, ‘clear, hold and build’, imported from the US, appears unsuitable for Indian conditions and for this type of civil conflict. The Union Home Minister appears to have uncritically formulated this strategy borrowed from the US experience abroad,but not in the US itself! In the prevailing civil war like situation in Dantewada, the Maoists took brilliant advantage of an unsolicited opportunity unwittingly provided by the unprepared and untrained CRPF jawans.  
   
   2. How do you assess the strength of the Naxalites in the context of recent mergers and expansions? What do you think about their strategy of bringing rebellion to the cities? 
   
   No precise figures can be provided at present about the prevailing strength of the Maoist forces. However, speculation is that over 22,000 young Maoists are spread across several states in the country and are growing in numbers because of the distress conditions and hunger prevailing in rural India. Apart from the CPI (Maoists), which is the biggest group, there are many other left wing extremist groups like Marxist-Leninists, which differ from the Maoists in terms of strategy and tactics. The Maoists appear to be well trained and equipped with the capability to execute dramatic attacks through their guerrilla warfare, as brought out in this incident and the earlier one in West Bengal in which a number of Eastern Frontier Rifles men were massacred. Both incidents have exposed the limitations of the traditional Indian policemen in dealing with such situations.One of the Maoists’ major problems is that they have not so far been able to expand into urban areas and have remained confined to rural and tribal areas only.   
   
   3. What basic flaws do you consider in the Government of India’s strategy to tackle the problem of Naxalism?
   
   The Government of India’s basic approach has been militaristic lacking in socio-economic perspective, while the problem is multi-dimensional calling for a multi-pronged approach. The socio-economic aspects have been well known and reported eloquently in many official reports especially the latest Planning Commission report on “Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas” (2008), which seems to have been totally ignored by the Union Home Ministry. The problem is that powerful precedents, derived from British experience, prevent the Home Ministry, from adopting appropriate strategies in responding to Maoism and makes it rely on strategy of use of force to tackle force. The possibility of peaceful methods and reconciliatory measures are ignored. Respect for human rights especially for the police forces and institutionalization of ‘closure’ and reconciliation   even while the conflict is on, are important. British precedents will not work. There is a need for far reaching reforms in the police and the legal structures. 
   
   The provisions of the Constitution of India for the protection and development of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes are not being respected, which gives rise to unrest.       
   
   4. What actions do you recommend which the Government of India should take and what approaches to follow in order to deal with this issue?
   
   Development policies need to be adapted for the welfare of the rural masses that have been ignored for too long. The neglected 28th report of the Commissioner for SCs and STs submitted to the President of India in 1986 provides a useful framework, which needs understanding and respect for the downtrodden. Decentralization of the administration from top to bottom and sensitization of the bureaucracy to social justice issues, are important steps taken by the Government of India. 
   
   5. Both the Government of India and the Maoists have the goal to develop the regions affected by Naxalism. Is there any difference in their viewpoint and approach? What development do they actually talk about?
   
   While both are saying they are keen on ‘development’, there is a fundamental difference between them regarding what they mean by ‘development’. The politically dominant view favours corporate-led capitalist development while the Maoists would appear to stand for a more socialist path to development. The Constitution of India seems to favour the latter!   
   
   6. How do you think India can resolve the Naxalite problem in the long run?
   
   The long-term solution to Maoism has necessarily to be in terms of reorienting development policies and governance in India in a radical and inclusive manner. Social movements must play an important role in this regard.
   
   7. What role do the neighbour countries play in this internal security problem and what influx do you see from Nepal and China?
   
   It would be wrong to blame Nepal or China for what are essentially internal problems of governance and development in India. The rise of Maoism in Nepal and the success of the Chinese in eradicating rural poverty are important lessons to be learntby India.

   Interview conducted by Suresh Jangu, Programme Co-ordinator, Democracy and Conflict Programme and Lennart Bendfeldt, Intern, Heinrich Böll Foundation- India Office.