Leadership for the Global South: A view from Indonesia

Indonesia was the host of the 1955 Bandung Conference, attended by 29 nations including China and India, whose sheer size and ambition have since positioned them as natural contenders for leadership of the Global South. The conference articulated a collective vision for a post-colonial world and gave rise to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), widely regarded as the precursor to the idea of a “Global South”.

Despite the conceptual vagueness—and even incoherence— of the idea of a Global South, the persistence of an archaic global architecture, shifts in the balance of power, and the increasingly erratic and autarchic behaviour of major powers such as the United States make the concept more relevant than ever.

It is therefore not a coincidence that the Bandung Conference was even mentioned by then German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the United Nations General Assembly in 2023 when he observed that “the call for self-determination and sovereign equality by Asian and African states in Bandung, Indonesia [is] more relevant today than ever before.”1

This reference by a leader of a major Western nation points to one of the key principles for the Global South in the spirit of the Bandung Conference: It is not a contention of non-Western nations against Western powers.2, but it is about a vision for an era where great powers and their dominance in whatever form is a thing of the past.

Through successive democratic governments, the foundation of Indonesia’s foreign policy and worldview has been reliably consistent in emphasising sovereign equality, non-alignment, and a rejection of a pole-centric view of the global order.

Relations with China and India

Indonesia has benefited from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and has generally welcomed development-oriented efforts such as their Global Development Initiative. However, later proposals like the Global Security Initiative have been approached with greater caution. Considering itself as ASEAN’s de facto leader, Indonesia remains open to cooperation in development but is careful in the security realm, where China’s global vision raises regional sensitivities.3

Beijing’s recent Global Governance Initiative (GGI), which seeks to integrate earlier proposals into a broader framework for reforming the global order, also finds resonance in Indonesia—but this does not amount to unqualified endorsement. Jakarta recognises that these initiatives are closely tied to China’s geopolitical ambitions.4

Indonesia remains to be convinced that Beijing’s commitment to international law and multilateralism extends beyond its national interests. China’s rejection of the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling on the South China Sea and its persistent ten-dash line claims remain particularly contentious, as they directly and indirectly implicate Indonesia and much of ASEAN. Nonetheless, ASEAN will likely continue to serve as a cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy.5

Indonesia and Indian relations on the other hand, while less intensive in terms of trade and investment, do share what Prime Minister Narendra Modi called “age-old cultural and historical ties.”6 The two countries, being the two largest democracies of the Global South, share common development challenges and overlapping worldviews. However, as observers noted “too often, India and Indonesia have faced challenges in parallel rather than in unison, operating essentially as competing foreign investment destinations.”7

India is the fourth largest trading partner to Indonesia that currently stands at US $30 billion, short of the $50 billion goal set for 2025 and one-fifth of China as top trading partner at $150 billion. While there remains considerable room for growth in bilateral trade, Indonesia values New Delhi’s Act East policy and its emphasis of “ASEAN centrality”.8 At the same time, Jakarta will remain cautious to avoid being drawn—whether in perception or in practice—into the India-China rivalry and their competing bids for leadership in the Global South.9

Rethinking Leadership in a Changing Global Order

At this stage, Indonesia benefits from and supports China’s development initiatives as well as India’s convening efforts, such as the Voice of the Global South Summits. Yet, like many others in the Global South, Indonesia also harbors its own leadership aspirations.10Given the diversity and complexity of the Global South, leadership cannot be monopolised; it must be collective. The roles of China and India must be complemented by those of Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and others that can represent their regions’ specific needs and interests.

Such a collective leadership among equals is crucial to avoid what some analysts describe as the “South of the Global South” problem11—where poorer and smaller nations risk being subordinated by more powerful ones such as China and India, replicating the very hierarchies the Global South seeks to transcend.12

The urgency of such leadership is heightened by shifts in the global order. Under the second Trump administration, the United States has, for better or worse, abdicated much of its traditional global leadership. Many observers argue that its policies have “irrevocably upended the global order,”13 while its tariff negotiations and transactional approach left a particularly negative impression in countries like Indonesia.14 This mercurial leadership has accelerated the unraveling of the post-World War II consensus—creating both instability and opportunity.

At this inflection point, the Global South has a chance to assert a more balanced, multipolar order rooted in the spirit of the Bandung Conference: One that is cooperative rather than coercive, collective rather than hierarchical. In this vision, great-power dominance gives way to shared leadership based on equality, mutual development, and non-alignment.15

China and India, as key actors in this emerging framework, can strengthen their credibility by aligning their ambitions with these collective ideals—demonstrating commitment through restraint and reciprocity. This would mean refraining from unilateral territorial claims, ensuring that development financing avoids the dependency traps of the past, and fostering competition that gives way to consensus and cooperation.