Rethinking Europe’s Engagement with the Global South

Europe’s strategic debate on the “Global South” has long been framed in reactive terms, largely driven by anxiety over eroding influence against rising powers. From belatedly countering China’s Belt and Road with the Global Gateway as a geopolitical counternarrative, to struggling to win support from developing countries in key UN votes, Europe often appears to be on the defensive in its engagement with the Global South. This reactive lens has not only severely narrowed Europe’s ability to act but also, crucially, locks Europe in the flawed mindset of viewing Global South countries primarily as arenas of great power competition, instead of increasingly assertive actors seeking diversified relationships to maximise their strategic autonomy.

At the same time, debates in Europe often overstate the coherence of the “Global South” and understate its internal diversity and agency. Global South countries are not choosing sides, neither between China and India, nor between the Global South and the “West”. While they can be a network of autonomous nations capable of united voice and coordinated action when their goals align, each country strives to secure its sovereign equality and maximise its own national interests. 

Many governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America combine Chinese infrastructure finance, Indian diplomatic and digital initiatives, and Western trade and security ties in flexible, hedging strategies designed to avoid overdependence on any single actor. For instance, in Sri Lanka, this takes the form not only of prominent Chinese-funded hard infrastructure projects but also a growing mix of Indian engagement—including both soft initiatives and hard-infrastructure investments—creating a diversified landscape of external partnerships. On the other hand, South-South-North “triangular cooperation” is considered integral to Kenya’s development and economic agenda. In the case of Chile, the country is diversifying its economic dependency by seeking a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with India, while maintaining significant trade relationships with China, the US and the EU.

Global South countries are not passive recipients of influence looking for leadership. They are buyers in a crowded marketplace shopping for diverse partnerships. Europe must position itself not as a defensive alternative to China or India, but as a proactive, credible and reliable partner in its own right. Europe’s core task is therefore not to ‘counter’ China or India, but to leverage its own comparative advantages—trade partnerships, multilateral commitment and green-technology capabilities—to become a reliable, attractive partner. Only by treating Global South countries as valuable partners—recognising their agency and placing them at the centre of engagement, rather than using them as instruments and backdrops in great power competition—can Europe shape an autonomous strategy to the Global South.

More practically, an autonomous European strategy also requires changes in internal governance and external communication. Internally, greater coordination between EU institutions, member states and European development finance is essential to present a coherent offer and avoid project‑level competition. Delegating decision‑making authority to field delegations and working more systematically with regional organisations such as the African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and Indian Ocean and Pacific forums could enhance responsiveness and local alignment. For many countries in the Global South, initiatives such as the Global Gateway promise strategic investment but struggle with speed, scale, and visibility in comparison to China’s streamlined model. How to efficiently move beyond rhetorical appeals of “shared values” to demonstrable delivery of tangible, equitable development outcomes remains an important task going forward. 

Externally, Europe needs to adjust its narrative. Europe’s trade and climate policies, while norm-driven, sometimes appear unilateral. For example, well-intentioned environmental regulations can be perceived as burdensome conditionalities rather than opportunities for green partnership, which are very much needed, especially in climate-vulnerable countries in the Global South. The recently concluded COP30 saw the disappointing result of the final decision making no reference to fossil fuels at all, once again demonstrating how fragile climate cooperation, shaped by financial inequalities, competing national interests, and deep-seated trust gaps between developed and developing countries continue to limit global progress.

Rather than framing engagement in terms of defending a liberal order against authoritarian encroachment, Europe should emphasise three themes that resonate across the Global South. First, respect for sovereignty and policy space is the basis. This means recognising partner countries’ right to chart their own growth paths, including the use of economic and industrial policy tools that reflect local priorities and constraints. Secondly, commitment to predictable rules and dispute‑settlement mechanisms are the attractions. As the US increasingly turns towards unilateralism, Europe can establish itself as the guarantor of the rule of laws that protect smaller nations in the Global South against the arbitrary coercion of superpowers, while anchoring its trade, investment, and climate initiatives in transparent, reliable, and accessible rules. Thirdly, Europe can showcase willingness to support reform of global economic governance to give greater voice to emerging and developing countries. Clear support for reform efforts in international financial institutions and for enhanced representation of Africa, Latin America and South Asia in global decision‑making bodies and real actions to show preparedness to share agenda-setting power in forums from the G20 (which India has already done) to the IMF boards would reinforce this message.

If Europe wants to rebuild its partnership with the Global South beyond the traditional lens of development aid, it must first define a new mindset: treating Global South states as co-architects, not recipients, of strategic cooperation. This requires a shift from donor-led assistance towards mutual, long-term investment partnerships that support industrialisation, energy transitions, and technological capacity in partner countries, while simultaneously advancing Europe’s own economic resilience and climate objectives. The reaffirmation between the EU and India to invest more in trilateral partnerships with third countries could prove to be a useful vehicle in this regard. 

From climate negotiations and global health to supply chains and digital governance, developing countries around the world are striving towards their own visions of a multipolar arena and are becoming a decisive force in setting the terms of the world order. In this context, Europe cannot secure a reliable, rules-based environment or deliver on its objectives without collaborating with Global South partners to reform multilateral institutions—ranging from development banks and debt frameworks to trade and governance rules—so that they reflect shared leadership and contemporary geopolitical realities. A serious engagement between Europe and the Global South, grounded in agency, sovereignty, and shared leadership, would move beyond influence-countering towards jointly building a fairer and more inclusive global order.