This article situates Chile’s foreign policy within the long arc of decolonisation, examining how it balances autonomy, diversification, and multilateralism amid shifting global power.
Chile's position regarding the emergence of the Global South, and the role of China and India, must be understood in the broader reconfiguration of global power relations currently underway. The latter is characterised by the emergence of new global actors and the acceleration of the crisis of the United States (US) as the leader of a unipolar system that emerged after the Cold War - what, from a Gramscian perspective, can be described as a historical period of hegemonic interregnum.
While some analysts understand this phase as the crisis of the Liberal International Order, there is an alternative, long-durée perspective, which interprets this trajectory as the most fundamental restructuring of the global order since the beginning of the modern era. This restructuring has transitioned through several phases: the long process of decolonisation of America since the 18th and 19th century, followed by Asia and Africa during the 20th century, leading to the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and, more recently, the rise of the emerging economies alongside the articulation of the Global South as a political concept.
Faced with this new reality, the US has responded by trying to impose its hegemony, increasingly through force and unilateralism. However, the long-term view suggests that, by the end of this century, Western hegemony will have weakened. Likely, by 2100 the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the G20 emerging economies will be far bigger than the GDP of the G20 advanced economies.
In this process of transformation towards an alternative international order, the countries of the Global South will be a decisive force. However, whether the Global South can effectively articulate and contribute to the creation of a fairer, more democratic and multilateral international order remains uncertain.
Chile’s Foreign Policy Traditions and the Global South
Against this backdrop, Chile has built a foreign policy from the Global South organised around a relatively stable set of principles, converging over time with most of Latin American states. These principles include the sovereign equality of states, non-intervention, the peaceful resolution of disputes and multilateralism, among others. Following decolonisation in the 19th century, Latin American countries had to manage the emergence and consolidation of US hegemony in the 20th century, which expressed itself in many direct and indirect US interventions in Latin America.
Consequently, recent US efforts to assert influence in countries like Panama and Venezuela revive long-standing historical memories of external intervention. The aforementioned foreign policy principles, combined with the desire to avoid geopolitical capture during the Cold War era, led Chile and other countries in the region to participate in the NAM as part of an active Third World diplomacy on the global stage. This orientation was evident in Chile’s early engagement with newly independent nations, exemplified by its presence at the 1947 Indian Independence Ceremony – the only Latin American country to attend – and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations in 1949. Consistent with this stance, Chile also became the first South American nation to recognise the People’s Republic of China in 1970.
Structural Shifts, Accommodation and Autonomy
In recent decades, Chilean trade relations have undergone a structural change. The country has moved from a US- and Europe-centred export orientation to a more diversified and interdependent position within the global economy. In 2024, the foreign trade of Chile represented 64 per cent of the country's GDP, organised in 35 trade agreements with 65 economies.
As in other Southern American countries, China became Chile's largest trading partner with 32 per cent of trade. It is followed by the US (17 per cent), the countries of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (13 per cent), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR, 12 per cent) and the European Union (11 per cent). On the other hand, India, currently the world's fifth-largest economy, ranked 11th as a partner in Chile's trade.
This structural shift in trade has significantly shaped Chile’s international relations, creating a strong incentive to pursue a more diversified, balanced, and more autonomous foreign policy. The implications of this shift became evident when from 2018 onwards the Trump administration pressed Latin American – and especially Southern American – countries to distance themselves from China. Chile’s response was both measured and autonomous: it accommodated some US demands while simultaneously deepening its institutional engagement with Beijing. This course was further underscored by Chile’s decision in 2025 to begin the process of joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a major trade pact connecting many Asia-Pacific economies.
Chile’s pursuit of a diversified and autonomous international engagement, however, was evident even before these developments. The Chile-China relationship had already been elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016, and Presidents Michelle Bachelet (2017), Sebastián Piñera (2019) and Gabriel Boric (2023) each participated in the Belt and Road Forums for International Cooperation.
While Chile clearly recognises the strategic value of its partnership with Beijing – viewing it as a stabilising power and a strong supporter of multilateralism, sustainability and a fairer form of globalisation – important divergences persist. Chile has not hesitated to voice these differences: it openly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and continues to be a strong advocate for human rights and democracy. This stance partially explains why it refrained from taking a clear position on its potential BRICS membership during its guest participation in the group’s 2025 summit in Brazil.
This approach is also evident in Chile’s relations with India. During President Boric’s visit to India in 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and he jointly announced the start of negotiations for a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). During this visit, Boric articulated the country´s long durée foreign policy in an interview with The Indian Express:
We don't want to depend on a single country, much less on a single leadership (…). He, Mr. Trump, represents everything I oppose. We respect China. China respects us. Okay, but we don't want to depend on China. We are not going to change one dependency for another. That's why I'm here in India.
Chile aims at strengthening both the political dialogue as well as the economic leverage of their bilateral relationship. Welcoming India´s initiative, Santiago participated in the two "Voices from the Global South" Summits organised during the Indian Presidency of the G20 in 2023 and in 2024. Thus, despite differences regarding climate change and non-proliferation, Chile sees India as a critical emerging global player regarding what former President Ricardo Lagos defined as Chile´s right to “multipertenencia” (multi-membership), which resembles the Indian evolution from non-alignment toward “multi-alignment”.
Navigating a Fragmented Order
The ongoing hegemonic interregnum is particularly challenging for countries like Chile because of the current crisis of Latin American regionalism, which weakens its influence in the Global South and on the configuration of the new international order. In this complex context, Chile has maintained a consistent approach, grounded in its long-durée foreign policy principles. Its strategies reflect a careful balancing of autonomy, diversification, and multilateral engagement, maintaining a degree of continuity while adapting to the dynamics of a changing international system.